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1Abstract
The purpose of this paper is to propose an innovative method of evaluating
the performance of active fund managers, by introducing to the field of
performance measurement the more appealing loss aversion utility theory.
We combine the latter to an already established performance measure
developed by Grinblatt and Titman (1989), to construct a new and improved
method of performance evaluation and then apply it for two distinct risk
preference scenarios. The new methodology is used to evaluate the
performance of a sample of UK pension funds over a 10-year period using
the Knight, Satchell and Tran (1995) family of distributions for the excess
returns. The results vary depending on the assumption of risk preferences:
the results obtained in the first scenario are controversial, whereas for the
second scenario, the new measure does seem to pick up on the timing skills
exhibited by active fund managers and then reward them accordingly.
JEL classification: C16, C20, C61, G11, G23
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1. Introduction
    The quest for active portfolio managers that can deliver abnormal excess
returns and beat a specified benchmark has been crucial for the portfolio
management industry.
Indeed, finding an accurate and reliable measure that is able to assess and
compare the performance of various fund managers has been stimulating the
finance literature for a long period.
    Since the tremendous growth that the mutual and pension fund industry
experienced –in the U.S. for example over 5.5 trillion dollars are currently
managed by the mutual fund industry, with roughly 3 trillion dollars
managed in equity funds (Chen et al., 2000) - there has been a lot of
attention directed towards portfolio performance measurement. On the one
3hand, investors sought a method that could value the service rendered by
active management and justify the fees and expenses they were paying. On
the other hand, fund managers wanted to illustrate the importance of their
role and justify why one should use active, rather than passive, strategies.
    Academic studies found this subject fascinating and tried to devise diverse
methods to tackle the number of issues at stake: measuring any abnormal
performance and assessing the superior ability of fund managers1, examining
whether there is any persistence in the performance of the actively managed
funds2 and finally constructing appropriate benchmarks that allow a genuine
comparison of active versus passive management3. The importance of these
issues lies in the fact that it is also a test of the efficient market hypothesis:
managers making abnormal returns contradict this crucial hypothesis.
    Indeed, from the Jensen measure (Jensen 1968,1969) to the more recent
and elaborate measures, the literature has offered fund managers and
investment consultants a wide range of assessment methods4 to choose from.
These measures aim at evaluating the overall performance of a fund as well
as its manager’s specific talents, whether his timing or selection abilities.
    This article’s contribution to this field is to propose a new method of
performance evaluation that combines the widely acceptable and very
intuitive loss aversion theory (Fishburn and Kochenberg (1979), Kahneman
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4and Tversky (1979,1992)) with an already established performance measure,
the Positive Period Weighting Measure (Grinblatt and Titman, 1989b), in the
aim of constructing an improved way of assessing the results of active fund
managers. We apply our methodology to a cross-sectional study of the
performance of 44 British pension fund managers and attempt to assess their
contri-butions and answer the ultimate question: Are these managers actually
capable of outperforming the benchmark?
    The paper proceeds as follows. Section two discusses first the key
concepts pertaining to the Positive Period Weighting Measure, hereafter PW
measure, as developed by Grinblatt and Titman (1989b) and then presents
the loss aversion utility function and its importance to the theory of utility
representation. The third section examines our model in a more formal and
detailed manner, and moves to a description of the methodology and
assumptions behind the construction of the newly modified version of the
PW measure, hereafter the LPW. Section four introduces the data available
for analysis and attempts to study the cross-sectional performance of its fund
managers by using five traditional measures as well as the PW measure
performance evaluation using the power utility function, as applied by
Grinblatt and Titman (1994). The results of a simple but quite effective two-
beta model regression are also reported in this section in order to pick up any
evidence of timing behaviour exhibited by the managers. Having analysed
the data via the traditional means, section five applies the LPW to our
sample of fund managers and analyses their performance for two different
scenarios of risk preferences. Finally, this paper performs a comparison and
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5study of these results, in the attempt to assess whether the new LPW
measure does actually provide the analyst with an edge.
2. Theoretical Background
2.1 Our contribution
    In this study, we examine the concept of loss aversion, in the aim of
providing the literature with an innovative method of assessing the
performance of active fund managers.
    The loss aversion utility function was developed as an alternative utility
representation that captures better the decision making process of individuals
when facing uncertainty. This theory has been proven to be a fairly accurate
model of individual choice and many empirical studies have reported
various evidence that support it. Much of this literature is reviewed in
Fishburn and Kochenberger (1979). Combining it with the positive period
weighting measure (PW) developed by Grinblatt and Titman (1989), we
shall construct a new and improved method of performance evaluation.
2.2 The Positive Period Weighting Measure (PW)
    In response to the well documented timing related biases of the Jensen
Measure5, Grinblatt and Titman (1989) proposed a new measure, the
Positive Period Weighting Measure (PW), defined to be a weighted sum of
the period by period excess returns of the portfolio being evaluated, in the
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6aim of overcoming these problems. Indeed, this measure possesses some
very crucial advantages over any other performance measure: its data
requirements are quite simple and it is not subject to any biases.
    In their article, Grinblatt and Titman (1989) proved the PW measure to be
very useful. Indeed, they showed that with the PW measure, an uninformed
investor would generate zero performance while an informed investor, with
selectivity and/or timing abilities, would generate positive performance if
“the selectivity and timing information is independent and the investor is a
positive market timer”.
    Moreover, the authors pointed out that “an interesting interpretation” of
their measure would be to choose as weights the investor’s marginal utilities.
In this case, the PW would measure the incremental change in an investor’s
utility from adding “a small amount” of the evaluated portfolio’s excess
return to his “unconditionally optimal” portfolio. As a result, in a subsequent
paper, Grinblatt and Titman (1994) implemented this notion, using for
weights the marginal utilities of an investor with a power utility function. As
a note, Grinblatt and Titman (1994)’ results showed that the Jensen and
Positive Period Weighting Measures were almost identical irrespective of
the benchmark used. However, the authors attributed this to the fact that
“most mutual funds fail to successfully time the market”.
    What this article proposes is to follow the methodology of the PW
measure outlined by Grinblatt and Titman (1994) to assess fund
performance, with one crucial difference. Instead of using the constraining
and undesirable assumption of a power utility function, it suggests the use of
the more academically satisfying and appealing assumption of a loss
aversion utility function.
72.3 Loss aversion utility theory
    Loss aversion utility theory was first developed by Fishburn and
Kochenberger (1979) and Kahneman and Tversky (1979, 1992) and has
since been used in a wide range of applications. It was put forward as an
answer to the wide dissatisfaction with traditional expected utility theory,
which was systematically criticised over recent years for not being an
adequate representation of an individual’s decision-making process when
confronted with uncertainty. Indeed, Kahneman and Tversky (1979)
discussed in their article major problems that traditional expected utility
theory face, showing how the latter implied a behaviour that was
inconsistent with empirical evidence that they had collected. As a response,
the authors proposed an alternative utility theory, prospect theory, which
overcame these shortcomings and was able to explain all the deviations
from, and inconsistencies of, expected utility theory. Prospect theory
proposed various important modifications to the utility theory, by first
recognising that “the carriers of value are gains and losses, not final assets”
(Tversky and Kahneman, 1992), meaning that individuals value more
changes in wealth than the final outcomes and second by devising a
nonlinear transformation of the probabilities to be used as “decision
weights”. However, one of the most crucial products of the prospect theory
was picking up on the existence of the most intuitive notion of loss aversion.
    Loss aversion theory stems from the observation that investors are more
sensitive to losses than to gains and reflects this asymmetry between losses
and gains by presenting a utility function that is “concave for gains, convex
for losses and steeper for losses than for gains” (Kahneman and Tversky,
81992). Indeed, as Shalev (2000) points out, many empirical studies6, whether
in the domain of economic or psychology, have provided evidence of this
behaviour: it was evident that “people are more motivated to minimise losses
than they are motivated to maximise gains”. This model of utility
representation was crucial in helping to solve many of the problems
encountered by traditional expected utility theory, such as the major “equity
premium puzzle” pointed out by Mehra and Prescott (1985) that is the
tendency to overinvest in equity if we assume power utility.
    Loss aversion utility function used in most of the literature, including this
article, is based on the first two-piece utility representation of individual
preferences, which was developed by Fishburn and Kochenberger (1979).
Indeed, having noted this separation between gains and losses, Fishburn and
Kochenberger (1979) made of use of this discovery to empirically analyse
the individual’s utility reactions to various cases of changes in wealth. Their
findings presented one of the first empirical evidences of the loss aversion
behaviour, by reporting that the slope of the utility function for losses was
on average five times steeper than the one for gains. The implications of
these results to the actual loss aversion utility function are discussed in a
more detailed manner in section five. A precise distinction however between
the two piece Von-Neumann Morgenstern utility function and loss aversion
depends on the role of the target rate that divides the “gains” from the
“losses”; in expected utility theory, this is typically a fixed parameter, where
as in loss aversion utility theory, it is variable dependent upon initial wealth
and/or other factors.
    Hwang and Satchell (2003) used this utility representation, combined with
the previous discussion, to improve on the loss aversion theory by providing
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9a solution to the asset allocation problem faced with such a setting. Indeed,
in their article, the authors derive a closed form expression, which can be
easily used and applied, for the optimal position in equity for an investor
who is characterised by a loss aversion utility function and a one period
world.
    As mentioned previously, this study makes use of all the above intuitive
and theoretically appealing theories and combines them with the field of
performance measurement, attempting to construct a new method of
evaluating the skills of active fund managers that is more consistent with
individual preferences and risk attitudes.
3. The model
3.1 The PW performance measure in more details
    We begin our discussion in this section by presenting a formal
presentation of the Positive Period Weighting measure (PW) as developed
by Grinblatt and Titman (1989). This measure, of which the Jensen Measure
 is shown to be a special case7, is defined by the authors to be a weighted
sum of the period by period excess returns of the portfolio being evaluated
and is formulated as follows:
            ∑
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where ptr~  is the period t excess return of the portfolio being evaluated and tIr~
is the period t excess return on the efficient portfolio chosen as benchmark.
Hence, to obtain this measure, one has to first choose a nonnegative vector
of weights that has the property of making the weighted sum of the excess
returns of the benchmark portfolio sum to 0 and then calculate the dot
product of this vector and the vector of excess returns of the portfolio being
evaluated. The performance scores, which result from this procedure,
attribute to each fund a positive or negative performance, thus placing it as
either an out- or an under-performer relative to the chosen benchmark.
    It is evident that this measure, combined with an appropriate and
meaningful vector of weights, presents the investor with a simple and
appealing method of performance evaluation that is, most importantly,
devoid of any biases that the traditional measures could be subject to.
Consequently, in an attempt to capture these advantages and use this
measure to construct a more accurate performance evaluation method, this
study tries to add to it a vector of weight that is most representative of the
investor’s preferences and risk aversion. Indeed, instead of using, as
Grinblatt and Titman (1994) did, the marginal utilities of a power utility
function for the weight vector, this study proposes to combine the PW
11
measure with a more appealing utility representation scheme, the loss
aversion utility function.
3.2 The optimal portfolio choice using Loss Aversion
    As Hwang and Satchell (2003) asserted, “dissatisfaction with power
utility functions has been a re-occurring theme in modern financial
economics”. Indeed, power utility function has been subject to various
criticisms on different levels in the recent years (Mehra and Prescott (1985)
and Campbell and Viceira (1999)), a fact that motivated this article to search
for a more satisfactory and realistic utility representation for investor
preferences.
    Indeed, being interested in the PW measure where marginal utilities are
used as weights for assessing fund performance, this study sought however a
different utility function to employ than the power utility function, the loss
aversion utility function.
    Given that W is final wealth, 0W  initial wealth and B the benchmark
return, it is formulated as follows:
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where the parameters 21 ,vv  and λ  are assumed positive.
    Different values for 21 ,vv  and λ  can generate different representations of
investor preferences. Indeed, as Hwang and Satchell (2003) note, if 0< 1v <1
and 0< 2v <1, then the investor would be risk averse with respect to gains and
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risk loving with respect to losses while it is the opposite case if 1v >1 and
2v >1.
    Having introduced the loss aversion utility function, the next step is to
make use of it to derive the utility optimal investment position, which for the
purpose of this study is between the risk-free asset and the benchmark.
The final wealth can be written as:
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where:
         
θ
   is defined to be the proportion of wealth held in equity
 fB rry −=     is the excess return on the index.
This implies that the gains are expressed as follows:
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Consequently, the first step toward deriving the expression for θ  would
entail solving the following maximisation problem:
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where the parameters 21 ,vv  and λ  are assumed positive.
Following Hwang and Satchell (2003), we obtain that:
              
1221
1
0
)1(
vvvv
pu
pWu −
−
−+




−
=
λ
θ
 =
12
1
0 )1(
1 vv
pu
pu
W
−
−
+




−λ
(5)
13
where ]0[ 1 >=+ yyEu v , ]0)[( 2 ≤−=− yyEu v  and )0( >= yprobp .
    In order to evaluate the above expression for θ , it is essential to attribute a
distribution function to the excess returns. However, Hwang and Satchell
(2003) realised that assuming that excess returns are normally distributed is
very often not “appropriate”, a claim which many papers have agreed upon
and presented evidence for. For instance, using Fama and Macbeth (1973)’s
results, Fama (1965) and Blume (1970) suggest that distributions of
common stock returns are ‘thick-tailed’ relative to the normal distribution
and probably conform better to nonnormal symmetric stable distributions
than to the normal”. As a result, Hwang and Satchell (2003) evaluated this
expression for θ  using instead of the normal distribution, the KST
distribution.
    In the aim of covering as well a more general aspect of this problem, this
article also, in calculating the value for θ , uses this broad family of
distribution presented in Knight, Satchell and Tran (1995). The benefit
behind using this distribution is that it also allows the model to “capture the
fundamental asymmetry in upwards versus downwards returns…by using
scale gamma distributions for the conditional distributions of positive and
negative returns” (Knight et al, 1995).
The authors define their distribution as follows:
            ttttt ZXZXX 21 )1( −−+= µ      (6)
where
tX  is in our case is equivalent to BIBI RRrry −=−= , the excess returns at
time t, with mean µ  equal to 0 since in the expression for θ , +u and −u are
conditional on the excess returns y being ≥  or < 0 respectively,
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and finally tX 1 and tX 2 are independent positive random variables with
density function denoted as 1f  and 2f .
As mentioned before, in order to capture the asymmetric risk pertaining to
excess returns, Knight et al. (1995) assumed the conditional distributions of
positive and negative returns to be scale gamma distributions:
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            for .2,1=i
Using the above expression, Hwang and Satchell (2003) obtain analytical
results for the expression of +u and −u :
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Replacing these results in the expression for θ  gives a closed form solution
for the optimal allocation of assets between the benchmark and the managed
fund.
The final step needed to be able to calculate the optimal allocation of assets
between the risk-free rate and the benchmark is the estimation of the KST
parameters ( 121 ,, λαα  and 2λ ) for the benchmark. This is done by maximum
likelihood estimation.


−
=
,10
1
pyprobabilitwith
pyprobabilitwith
Zt
15
    Now that the expression for the optimal position in the benchmark has
been derived, this article proceeds to finding the expression of the PW
measure while using the above loss aversion utility function; this will result
in a new modified measure that we will refer to henceforth as the LPW.
3.3 The framework behind the new performance measure (LPW)
    To construct this new LPW measure, this section combines the PW
measure and the loss aversion function as presented in the previous two
sections.
    In doing so, we follow the five-step procedure outlined in the appendix of
Grinblatt and Titman (1994), adapting it to this new setting. This model will
only consider a world with two assets, a risk-free asset with return fr  and the
index fund with return Br .
    Now that the first step was completed in section 3.2 and the value of θ
was determined, the time series of returns of the optimal portfolio is
calculated, )(0 fttB rrW −θ , where for simplicity, the initial wealth is set at one
for each observation.
    Using the loss aversion utility function, the marginal utility of this wealth
level can hence be calculated at time t:
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12)( −− vtXλ   if 0≤tX                (9)
where )(0 fttBt rrWX −= θ .
In order to calculate the weight vector needed for the LPW measure, the
above marginal utilities are rescaled so that they satisfy the condition that
requires them to sum to one:
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Then, as presented earlier, the LPW measure is computed as the dot product
of the weight vector calculated above and the excess return vector of the
portfolio being evaluated, i.e.,
            ∑= t ptt RwLPW                (11)
    Having detailed the methodology behind the derivation of the newly
modified performance measure, this article can now move to the empirical
application of the results derived in the above sections. However, before
doing that, the next section will introduce the data available to this study and
then analyse its properties by evaluating the cross-sectional performance of
the fund managers using conventional performance measures and by
performing a simple two-beta regression model to obtain an indication of the
fund managers’ timing skills. This will help us understand better the results
presented in section five, where the LPW measure is applied to the same
data.
4. Preliminary analysis of the data
4.1 The data
    The data was obtained from Mercer and consists of quarterly net returns
for 44 British pension fund managers for a 10-year period, starting in March
1990 and ending in September 1999. For the risk-free asset, the returns on
the three-month UK Treasury bill were used. As for the benchmark, the
Caps pooled median was considered as an adequate candidate.
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4.2 Preliminary measures
    To analyse and examine the data thoroughly, this section utilises five
traditional measures, widely used in the empirical literature, to assess the
performance of the fund managers, as well as the PW measure as developed
and applied by Grinblatt and Titman (1989, 1994). The latter measure is the
basis of the modified LPW measure that has been derived in section three
and will help us understand even better the performance of our sample funds
and later assess whether the modification did improve the performance
evaluation process. We note here that since all the above measures are
applied over the 40 quarters under consideration (March 1990 to March
1999), we set, in the next calculations, 40=T , and that the abnormal
performance of a fund is calculated relative to the benchmark considered,
i.e. the Caps pooled median.
    The Jensen Measure, is calculated as the intercept α  in the regression of
the excess returns of the fund being evaluated against the benchmark excess
returns, over the 40 quarters being considered in this study:
            tjtFtBpptFtp uRRRR ~]
~[~ +−+=− βα Tt ,...,1=              (12)
where tpR
~
  is the return on the fund being analysed and tBR
~
 is the return on
the bench-mark. The t-statistic reported for the Jensen alphas are the
standard intercept t-statistic that result from the above regression.
    The Treynor-Mazuy (1966) measure involves the following quadratic
regression:
            tjtFtBptFtBpptFtp uRRRRRR ~]
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where, following Grinblatt and Titman (1994) presentation, pα  represents an
estimate of the fund manager’s selectivity abilities, )~var(*2 Bp Rβ represents an
estimate of the fund manager’s timing abilities, and finally, the Treynor-
Mazuy total performance measure is defined to be:
            
)~var(*2 Bpp RTM βα +=              (14)
The t-statistic for the Treynor-Mazuy total performance measure is slightly
more complex than the rest of the measures. Grinblatt and Titman (1994)
define it as being a test statistic with a t-distribution with T-K-1 degrees of
freedom, where T is the number of returns and K the number of benchmarks
used. It is computed as being the ratio of the Treynor-Mazuy total
performance measure over its standard error, )(TMsTM , where
VqqTMs ′=)( , 12 )()( −′= XXesV , )(es  is the standard error of the Jensen
regression for the fund being evaluated and X is the 3×T  matrix of
regressors in the quadratic regression defined above. Hence, V is the
variance-covariance matrix of the coefficients in this quadratic regression,
conditional on the benchmark excess returns and q′  is the following 13×
vector: ( ))~var(01 BR .
    The Sharpe ratio or the reward-to-risk ratio is the ratio of a fund’s excess
return, here relative to the benchmark being used, to the standard deviation
of this fund’s return. It is hence a measure of “risk bearing” where the risk is
measured by the standard deviation of the returns on the particular fund
being analysed. It is thus computed as follows:
            pppSR σµ=              (15)
where:
19
pµ    is the expected excess arithmetic return on fund p over the 40 quarters
in the sample i.e. TRR
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    The Sortino ratio relies on the same concept as the Sharpe ratio, the
difference being that it uses as a measure of risk of the fund’s volatility the
square root of the semi-variance of the fund returns. It is formulated as
follows:
            iii SVT µ=              (16)
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    Finally, the information ration (IR) for each fund is calculated as follows:
            Information ratio =
ErrorTrackingAnnualised
eturnsRExcessAnnualised
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T is the number of quarters and tCapsitti RRer −=  stands for excess returns of
fund i  in quarter t.
    The last measure to be used in this section to evaluate the performance of
our sample of funds is the PW, following Grinblatt and Titman (1994)’s
methodology as outlined in their paper’s appendix. Indeed, in their article,
GT assume that the investor possesses a power utility function,
vXXu −−= )()( , and hence they set the weights in the PW calculations8 to be
equal to the marginal utilities of an investor possessing such a utility
representation.
    The only difference in our application of their methodology is that this
paper first sets the optimal combination between the risk free asset and the
benchmark to be equal to 0.75, assuming that the choice of a 75%
investment level in the risky asset is a plausible estimation of the actual level
in the UK market, and then solve the following minimisation problem:
Finding the value of v  that minimise the weighted sum of the excess returns
of the benchmark portfolio∑
=
T
t
tBt rw
1
~~
9
 subject to the condition that 75.0=θ .
The solution of the above minimisation problem yield the following value
for the risk-aversion parameter for the power utility function, v = 5.6247,
while the resulting figure for the weighted sum of the excess benchmark
returns over the period under consideration ∑
=
T
t
tBt rw
1
~~ is extremely negligible,
being equal to 9100551.8 −× .
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    Having introduced the six performances measures to be used in this
section as well as the intuition behind them, the results obtained from
applying them to assess the performance of the 44 active UK fund managers
over the 10-year sample period and their descriptive statistics are exposed in
table 1 and 2 respectively.
TABLE 1
Preliminary performance measures applied to the 44 UK active fund managers
over the 10-year sample period
                    PW     Jensen          T-M        Sharpe    Sortino   Inform.
            (power utility)  Measure     Measure      Ratio      Ratio       Ratio
Abn Amro 1.6287 1.5876 1.5732 0.1753 0.8375 0.5513
(1.4155) (1.3898) (1.3769)
Aegon 0.0996 0.0534 0.0467 -0.0136 -0.0952 -0.1374
(0.4128) (0.2229) (0.1947)
Axa Sun Life -0.0343 -0.0705 -0.0745 -0.0041 -0.0398 -0.0564
(-0.8026) (-1.1777) (-0.3679)
Britannic Inv. Managers 0.2627 0.3125 0.3199 0.0618 0.8083 0.7118
(1.1387) (1.3649) (1.3966)
Cazenove Concentrated 0.7589 0.7498 0.7463 0.0491 0.2465 0.2520
(1.7262) (1.7173) (1.7094)
Clerical Medical 0.2221 0.1947 0.1894 0.0285 0.4210 0.3766
(1.1018) (0.9725) (0.9462)
Colonial -0.4401 -0.3621 -0.3512 -0.0430 -0.2598 -0.4377
(-1.6657) (-1.3805) (-1.3387)
Deutsche 0.6896 0.6432 0.6368 0.0822 0.8273 0.7427
(2.3432) (2.2012) (2.1787)
Dresdner RCM 0.1127 0.0594 0.0530 0.0338 0.2503 0.2188
(0.2543) (0.1351) (0.1203)
Equitable High Income -0.5785 -0.5461 -0.5387 -0.0794 -0.2513 -0.4451
(-1.1918) (-1.1332) (-1.1176)
Equitable Pelican -0.5667 -0.5963 -0.5982 -0.0645 -0.3237 -0.6323
(-2.0449) (-2.1668) (-2.1737)
Equitable Spec. Sits. -2.0626 -2.0935 -2.0968 -0.2461 -0.4287 -0.8417
(-2.2767) (-2.3274) (-2.3306)
Friends I&S Stewardship 0.5765 0.6024 0.6077 -0.0054 -0.0125 -0.0192
(0.9346) (0.9836) (0.9921)
Friends Ivory & Sime 0.3201 0.2550 0.2440 0.0505 0.7202 0.5181
(1.2099) (0.9708) (0.9287)
Friendsivory&Sime (FP) 0.1713 0.1888 0.1884 0.0220 0.1399 0.1541
(0.4437) (0.4924) (0.4914)
Friendsivory&Sime (I&S) 0.1293 0.1808 0.1888 0.0301 0.2013 0.2293
(0.3567) (0.5023) (0.5245)
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Gartmore 0.5143 0.4446 0.4329 0.0380 0.2301 0.2593
(1.3824) (1.2034) (1.1716)
Gartmore/Natwest Index 0.1096 0.1077 0.1080 0.0166 0.4385 0.4984
(1.2570) (1.2432) (1.2470)
Govett 0.0750 0.1261 0.1316 0.0010 0.0040 0.0062
(0.1766) (0.2993) (0.3122)
Guardian -1.1028 -1.0129 -0.9983 -0.0273 -0.1071 -0.1747
(-2.6704) (-2.4704) (-2.4342)
Henderson 0.2152 0.2171 0.2189 0.0133 0.1199 0.1595
(1.0451) (1.0624) (1.0708)
Hill Samuel 0.0929 0.0470 0.0385 -0.0137 -0.1362 -0.1980
(0.5745) (0.2925) (0.2397)
INVESCO 0.1001 0.0947 0.0945 0.0144 0.3406 0.4120
(1.0934) (1.0430) (1.0404)
Invesco UK Core -0.4477 -0.4577 -0.4579 -0.0382 -0.1388 -0.2203
(-0.8926) (-0.9193) (-0.9193)
TABLE 1 (continued)
                    PW     Jensen          T-M        Sharpe    Sortino   Inform.
            (power utility)  Measure     Measure      Ratio      Ratio       Ratio
KQEP Enhanced 0.3406 0.3355 0.3345 0.0495 1.6502 0.9127
(2.3714) (2.3523) (2.3452)
Legal & General i 0.0994 0.0977 0.0979 0.0176 0.4776 0.5366
(1.1628) (1.1508) (1.1536)
Legal & General p 0.0868 0.0999 0.1018 0.0207 0.4488 0.4896
(0.7881) (0.9136) (0.9310)
London Life -0.1134 -0.1759 -0.1865 -0.0296 -0.2073 -0.3351
(-0.4922) (-0.7693) (-0.8153)
Martin Currie UK Growth -0.1807 -0.0446 -0.0280 0.0015 0.0059 0.0084
(-0.3478) (-0.0865) (-0.0543)
Merrill Lynch Balanced 0.1905 0.1944 0.1949 0.0103 0.0794 0.1070
(0.7872) (0.8090) (0.8110)
Morley (was CU) -0.2019 -0.1409 -0.1305 -0.0265 -0.1940 -0.3299
(-0.9748) (-0.6853) (-0.6347)
Morley (was GA) 0.0636 0.0280 0.0234 -0.0287 -0.2100 -0.3406
(0.3530) (0.1568) (0.1308)
Morley PP (Was NU) 0.0724 0.0096 0.0002 0.0188 0.2936 0.2171
(0.3106) (0.0413) (0.0007)
National Mutual Life -0.1778 -0.1494 -0.1453 -0.0127 -0.0886 -0.1233
(-0.6380) (-0.5400) (-0.5252)
Northern Trust -0.0181 0.0118 0.0172 0.0083 0.0412 0.0565
(-0.0444) (0.0292) (0.0427)
Prudential M&G 0.0808 0.1338 0.1419 0.0018 0.0170 0.0252
(0.4671) (0.7790) (0.8260)
Royal Sunalliance 0.0902 0.0635 0.0588 0.0143 0.1445 0.1444
(0.3387) (0.0635) (0.0588)
Scottish Life -0.0991 -0.1042 -0.1052 -0.0108 -0.1524 -0.2108
(-0.7358) (-0.7791) (-0.7864)
SLC Asset Management -0.1312 -0.1664 -0.1718 -0.0285 -0.2255 -0.3834
(-0.6823) (-0.8714) (-0.8995)
Standard Life 0.2037 0.2079 0.2087 0.0072 0.0788 0.1091
(1.3501) (1.3882) (1.3932)
Swiss Life 0.7583 0.6742 0.6606 0.1042 0.7231 0.5197
(1.2485) (1.1180) (1.0953)
Swiss Life Index 0.1749 0.1363 0.1317 -0.0128 -0.0913 -0.1301
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(1.0505) (0.6234) (0.7964)
Winterthur Life -0.8206 -0.8287 -0.8276 -0.0716 -0.3181 -0.5890
(-2.4354) (-2.4764) (-2.4733)
Zurich Scudder 0.1634 0.1581 0.1570 0.0195 0.1977 0.2530
(0.8030) (0.7826) (0.7767)
    Examining the results and their statistics, we can see that there is no
strong evidence of abnormal performance exhibited by our sample of funds
in the 10-year period considered. In fact, for the six measures considered,
out of the 44 funds, only one-quarter (i.e. 11 funds) exhibit statistically
significant results at the 10% significance level, with five funds significantly
underperforming the benchmark and just six significantly outperforming it.
For a more thorough analysis of the obtained performance scores, we will
consider next the individual results as exhibited by each of the measure
considered with one exception only: the results in tables 1 and 2 show that
the Jensen and the Treynor-Mazuy measure give out the same inferences on
the abnormal performance of the various funds and have extremely similar
statistics. Consequently, we will just present an analysis of the former
measure.
TABLE 2
The descriptive statistics of the performance results presented in table 1
PW Jensen
Measure
T-M
Measure
Sharpe
Ratio
Sortino
Ratio
Inform.
Ratio
Mean 0.0324 0.0288 0.0281 0.0030 0.1469 0.0651
Standard Error 0.0824 0.0807 0.0804 0.0089 0.0607 0.0592
Standard Deviation 0.5463 0.5354 0.5330 0.0592 0.4028 0.3924
Sample Variance 0.2985 0.2866 0.2841 0.0035 0.1622 0.1540
Excess Kurtosis 4.8094 5.4021 5.4916 6.7103 2.7447 -0.4307
Skewness -0.9367 -1.0632 -1.0923 -1.1106 1.4312 -0.0575
Range 3.6912 3.6811 3.6699 0.4214 2.0789 1.7543
Count 44 44 44 44 44 44
Minimum value -2.0626 -2.0935 -2.0968 -0.2461 -0.4287 -0.8417
1st quartile -0.1178 -0.1134 -0.1115 -0.0169 -0.1368 -0.2012
Median 0.0961 0.0962 0.0962 0.0078 0.0600 0.08175
3rd quartile 0.2065 0.1980 0.1984 0.0236 0.3053 0.2886
Maximum 1.6287 1.5876 1.5732 0.1753 1.6502 0.9127
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Jarque-Bera Statistic 48.8400 61.7921 64.0388 91.5975 28.8328 0.3644
Probability 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.000000 0.000000 0.8334
    According to the Jensen measure, the average abnormal performance of
the 44 funds under consideration over the 10-year period is quite negligible.
Indeed, the mean performance value is equal to 0.0288% and lies in the
second quartile, denoting a low level of abnormal performance. This is
accentuated by the fact that the results are shown to be negatively skewed as
reported in table 2; the bottom 50% of the funds exhibit performance scores
covering a range of 1.9801%, while the top 50%’s range is 1.3896%.
Moreover, the interquartile range is equal to 0.3114%, ranging from -0.1134
to 0.1980%, a very low level of performance for 50% of the funds. As
mentioned earlier, the Treynor-Mazuy performance measure does report
extremely similar results.
    As conveyed by the first two measures, the Sharpe ratio also does not find
strong evidence of positive abnormal performance by our sample of funds.
Indeed, the mean value is merely equal to 0.0030% and lies in the second
quartile. The median is also very low, at 0.0778%. It is also very worth
noting the narrowness of the second and third quartile. Indeed, the
interquartile range is merely equal to 0.0405% and thus, 50% of the funds
are being very negligibly rewarded for the risk they are incurring. Even
when examining the top quartile, one can see that the results are not very
high, varying from 0.0236 to 0.1175% with the range being 0.0939; while if
one studies the bottom quartile, the results turn out to be quite low, varying
from –0.0169 to –0.2461%, with a range equal to 0.2292. These findings
confirm the results reported by the first two performance measures, by
indicating that there is no evidence of strong positive abnormal performance
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and that the underperformance of the funds relative to the benchmark is on a
higher level than the outperformance. Indeed, here also, the results are
reported to be negatively skewed.
    Moving to the Sortino ratio, the results seem to be indicating a better
performance than the one reported by the previous three measures: the mean
performance is at a higher level, at 0.1469%, and lies in the third quartile. In
addition, the results are positively skewed as one can see in table 2; in fact,
the top quartile varies from 0.3053 to 1.6502% (with a range equal 1.3449)
while the bottom quartile varies from –0.1368 to –0.4287% (the range being
0.2919). Hence, when we considered only downside risk in performance
evaluation, the funds’ performance improved.
    As for the information ratio, it presents nearly symmetrical results.
Indeed, according to the Jarque-Bera statistic, the information ratio
performance results have a normal distribution with mean equal to 0.0651
and a variance equal to 0.1539 and hence, they are nearly half-split between
positive and negative abnormal performance, ranging for -0.8417% to
0.9127. As a result, for half of the funds, the tilts away from the benchmark
were successful and positively rewarded; while for the other half, they
generated negative abnormal performance. Hence, according to the
information ratio, the top quartile of fund managers does seem to possess
some skills in managing money.
    Finally, the results obtained form applying the PW measure to our sample
of fund managers seem to agree with the findings of the conventional
measures: There is no strong evidence of abnormal performance.  Indeed,
the results range from –2.0626 to 1.6287% and the median fund exhibit a
very small abnormal performance equal to 0.0961%. The mean of the
performance measures lie in the second quartile, at the very low level of
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0.0324%, which indicates that on average the funds did not outperform the
benchmark by any significant level. To understand better the distribution of
these results, we examine first the second and third quartile range: they are
respectively 0.2139% and 0.1104%. Thus, the magnitude of
underperformance around the centre of the results is higher than the
magnitude of outperformance. This is also evident when looking at the
results of the two extreme quartiles, where the top 25% of funds beat the
benchmark by a margin ranging from 0.2065% to 1.6287% - the array hence
being 1.4222% - while the bottom 25% of funds underperformed the
benchmark from –0.1178% to –2.0626% - the range being equal to 1.9448%.
This is confirmed in table 2 where the performance results given by the PW
measure are reported to be negatively skewed. It is worth noting here
however that the significant results reported by the PW measure occurred at
the two extremes tails of the distribution. On the one hand, the five funds
that significantly underperformed lie at the end of the first quartile, ranging
from Colonial at –0.4401% to Equitable Spec. Sits at –2.0626%; on the other
hand, from the six funds that showed significant signs of abnormal
performance, five lie at the end of the top quartile, ranging from KQEP
Enhanced at 0.3406% to Abn Amro at 1.6287%. Comparing these results
with the mean, 0.0324%, and the median, 0.0961%, these values are quite
extreme. This finding combined with the high level of excess kurtosis
reported in table 2 indicates that the probability of obtaining an extreme
fund, either a winner or a looser, could be fairly high.
    Hence overall, according to the preliminary measures studied in this
section, the funds do not exhibit convincing signs of abnormal performance.
The average abnormal performance of all funds is reported to be extremely
low, nearly equal to 0, the only exception being the average performance
27
reported by the Sortino ratio. Moreover, with all the measures considered,
only six out of the 44 funds actually exhibit significantly positive abnormal
performance. However, to understand better the relation between the
performance results reported by the six different performance measures, this
study analyses and compares them in the aim of finding whether they are
really picking up the same information and hence actually giving out
identical inferences.
    Comparing the top and bottom quartiles of funds, we find that the
measures are split in two groups. On one hand, the Sortino ratio and the
Information ratio seem to agree highly by having 11 out of 11 funds in
common in both quartiles, with only slightly different rankings. The PW
measure, the Jensen measure and the Sharpe ratio on the other hand present
similar result by having at least 9 funds in common between them. However,
it is worth noting that in the case of the bottom 25% of funds, all the
performance measures seem to agree more and the above two groups have
eight to ten fund in common. Consequently, one can already say that the
Jensen measure, the Sharpe ratio and the PW measure seem to present the
same performance evaluation of the funds, which is somewhat slightly
different than the inferences given by the Sortino and the Information ratios
that tend to converge more. To see this more clearly, this study analyses next
the correlations between the various measures, which are presented in the
following table:
TABLE 3
The correlations between abnormal performance as measured by the six different performance measures
PW
measure
Jensen
measure
TM
measure
Sharpe
ratio Sortino ratio
Information
ratio
PW measure 1
Jensen measure 0.9965 1
T-Mazuy measure 0.9953 0.9999 1
Sharpe ratio 0.9204 0.9257 0.9258 1
Sortino ratio 0.6216 0.6178 0.6168 0.7342 1
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Information ratio 0.7196 0.7235 0.7238 0.8263 0.9290 1
    Examining closely the results in table 3, we notice that the correlations
between the first four measures are extremely high, all exceeding 0.9.
Indeed, the Jensen and the Treynor-Mazuy measure are characterised by the
highest correlation level which is nearly perfect, at 0.9999, making it evident
that they capture the same information and hence give out the same
inferences on the abnormal performance of the various funds. In addition,
the PW measure’s correlation with these two measures is also extremely
high, of the order of 0.99, while the Sharpe ratio’s correlation with each of
the three mentioned measures is around 0.92. Consequently, these four
measures yield very similar conclusions and do not seem to offer the
investor an edge, as they seem to be picking up similar information.
However, the last two measures, the Sortino and the Information ratio,
which are highly correlated (0.9290), seem to present different results than
the former four measures. Indeed, both of them exhibit relatively low
correlations with each of the first four measures. This might be due to the
fact that both of them do portray the risk of the portfolio in a very precise
and different manner. For the Sortino ratio, the fund’s downside risk is the
most important and is the only one considered in evaluating the fund’s
performance while for the Information ratio, it is the tracking error, which
represents the risk of deviating from the benchmark, that is the most
relevant: is the manager’s tilts away from the benchmark successful in
generating excess returns?
    The next section adds to this a thorough analysis of the data at hand by
applying to it a fairly simple but quite indicative two-beta regression model,
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in the aim of better understanding the behaviour exhibited by of our sample
of active fund managers.
4.3 The two-beta regression model
    To analyse and understand better the performance of the fund managers,
this section applies a fairly simple model to the data in the aim of detecting
whether the funds under study were actually timing the market during the
sample period. The method employed here consists of constructing a two-
beta model, one for when the market is up and one for when it is down, that
captures the relationship between each fund’s excess returns and the market
portfolio return in these both setting. This model attempts to detect any
market timing behaviour exhibited by the funds, since if the respective
managers were actually timing the market during that particular period, one
would expect the two betas to be highly significant. A high beta when the
market is up and a low beta when the market is down would reflect a fund
manager who had superior information and was able to capitalise on it to
successfully time the market.
    The regression model is as follows:
            
errorRRRR tMdtMuftit +++=−
−+ ββα)( , 2,1=i  and Tt ,...,1=              (22)
where
            
+
tMR = ),0max( fttM RR −
       
−
tMR = ),0min( fttM RR −
and
       tMR  is the return on the market portfolio, here being the FT all share.
30
    The results of the above model are presented in table 4, and examining
them, we do not pick up strong indication of any timing skills exhibited by
the fund managers in our sample. In fact, it seems that the majority of the
funds have been mainly following the market very closely over our sample
period, in its both up and down states, and thus have not been exhibiting any
timing behaviour. To see this more clearly, the descriptive statistics of the
regression coefficients are presented later in table 5.
TABLE 4
The two-beta model regression for the 44 funds under study
                               α            uβ dβ                                α            uβ dβ                                α            uβ dβ
Abn Amro Friendsivory&Sime (I&S) Morley (was CU)
Estimate 1.0427 1.1102 0.9399 Estimate 0.6820 0.9222 1.1163 Estimate 0.4973 0.8684 1.1088
Standard Error 1.8847 0.2459 0.3156 Standard Error 0.5849 0.0763 0.0980 Standard Error 0.2964 0.0387 0.0496
t-value 0.5532 4.5158 2.9777 t-value 1.1660 12.0868 11.3955 t-value 1.6780 22.4610 22.3403
Aegon Gartmore Morley (was GA)
Estimate -0.3194 0.9754 0.8831 Estimate -0.3238 1.0210 0.7897 Estimate -0.4066 0.9593 0.8458
Standard Error 0.3809 0.0497 0.0638 Standard Error 0.6312 0.0823 0.1057 Standard Error 0.2798 0.0365 0.0469
t-value -0.8386 19.6340 13.8458 t-value -0.5129 12.3988 7.4703 t-value -1.4532 26.2824 18.0506
AXA Sun Life Gartmore/Natwest Index Morley PP (Was NU)
Estimate -0.4588 1.0381 0.9417 Estimate 0.0215 0.9919 0.9976 Estimate -0.6594 1.1081 0.9196
Standard Error 0.3167 0.0413 0.0530 Standard Error 0.0539 0.0070 0.0090 Standard Error 0.3762 0.0491 0.0630
t-value -1.4487 25.1308 17.7578 t-value 0.3983 141.0599 110.5092 t-value -1.7527 22.5793 14.5954
Britannic Govett National Mutual Life
Estimate 0.7723 0.9688 1.1504 Estimate 0.3537 0.9050 1.0110 Estimate -0.0251 0.9730 1.0469
Standard Error 0.3866 0.0504 0.0647 Standard Error 0.6661 0.0869 0.1116 Standard Error 0.4340 0.0566 0.7268
t-value 1.9978 19.2115 17.7701 t-value 0.5310 10.4152 9.0635 t-value -0.0578 17.1871 14.4041
Cazenove Con. Guardian Norhtern Trust
Estimate 0.3734 0.8878 0.7796 Estimate -0.2543 1.1087 1.3953 Estimate 0.2985 0.9459 1.0615
Standard Error 0.7555 0.0985 0.1265 Standard Error 0.6482 0.0846 0.1086 Standard Error 0.7110 0.0928 0.1191
t-value 0.4943 9.0091 6.1624 t-value -0.3923 13.1117 12.8526 t-value 0.4198 10.1979 8.9146
Clerical Medical Henderson Prudential M&G
Estimate -0.2017 1.0317 0.9278 Estimate 0.3609 0.9159 0.9945 Estimate 0.5074 0.8842 1.0377
Standard Error 0.3843 0.0501 0.0644 Standard Error 0.3139 0.0410 0.0526 Standard Error 0.2534 0.0331 0.0424
t-value -0.5247 20.5788 14.4156 t-value 1.1495 22.3655 18.9161 t-value 2.0022 26.7448 24.4502
Colonial Hill Samuel Royal Sunalliance
Estimate 0.2623 0.8969 1.1320 Estimate -0.5795 1.0107 0.8328 Estimate -0.1648 1.0183 0.9735
Standard Error 0.4144 0.0541 0.0694 Standard Error 0.2704 0.0353 0.0453 Standard Error 0.4444 0.0580 0.0744
t-value 0.6330 16.5935 16.3131 t-value -2.1429 28.6533 18.3905 t-value -0.3708 17.5676 13.0812
Deutsche INVESCO I Scottish Life
Estimate 0.1670 1.0293 0.8976 Estimate -0.0136 0.9938 0.9927 Estimate -0.2597 1.0003 0.9785
Standard Error 0.5194 0.0678 0.0870 Standard Error 0.0337 0.0044 0.0056 Standard Error 0.2642 0.0345 0.0442
t-value 0.3215 15.1908 10.3187 t-value -0.4028 226.3713 176.1277 t-value -0.9830 29.0211 22.1139
Dresdner RCM Invesco UK Core SLC Asset Management
Estimate -0.3088 1.0915 0.9974 Estimate -0.5661 1.0304 1.0242 Estimate -0.6167 1.0185 0.8994
Standard Error 0.7476 0.0975 0.1252 Standard Error 0.8171 0.1066 0.1368 Standard Error 0.3302 0.0431 0.0553
t-value -0.4130 11.1931 7.9666 t-value 0.1066 9.6673 7.4854 t-value -1.8675 23.6439 16.2636
Equitable High Income KQEP Enhanced Standard Life
Estimate -0.1988 0.8999 1.0409 Estimate 0.1673 1.0113 0.9901 Estimate 0.1937 0.9264 0.9536
Standard Error 0.7871 0.1027 0.1318 Standard Error 0.1937 0.0253 0.0324 Standard Error 0.2098 0.0274 0.0351
t-value -0.2525 8.7653 7.8972 t-value 0.8635 40.0215 30.5213 t-value 0.9233 33.8556 27.1475
Equitable Pelican Legal & Generali Swiss Life
Estimate -0.9269 1.0448 0.9655 Estimate 0.0199 0.9967 1.0054 Estimate 0.0077 1.1365 0.9412
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Standard Error 0.4713 0.0615 0.0789 Standard Error 0.0402 0.0052 0.0067 Standard Error 1.0058 0.1312 0.1684
t-value -1.9666 16.9942 12.2327 t-value 0.4959 190.1246 149.3954 t-value 0.0077 8.6626 5.5880
Equitable Spec. Sits. Legal & Generalp Swiss Life Index
Estimate -2.6004 1.0036 0.8534 Estimate 0.1083 0.9917 1.0281 Estimate -0.1803 0.9460 0.8751
Standard Error 1.4747 0.1924 0.2470 Standard Error 0.1456 0.0190 0.2438 Standard Error 0.3049 0.0398 0.0511
t-value -1.7634 5.2170 3.4556 t-value 0.7437 52.2275 42.1723 t-value -0.5913 23.7873 17.1388
Friends I&S Stewardship London Life Winterthur Life
Estimate 0.9379 0.7176 0.8424 Estimate -0.9645 1.0659 0.8383 Estimate -0.9028 1.0567 1.0636
Standard Error 1.0108 0.1319 0.1693 Standard Error 0.3342 0.0436 0.0560 Standard Error 0.5607 0.0731 0.0939
t-value 0.9279 5.4426 4.9766 t-value -2.8862 24.4517 14.9802 t-value -1.6102 14.4464 11.3263
Friends Ivory & Sime Martin Currie UK Growth Zurich Scudder
Estimate -0.5178 1.1249 0.9015 Estimate 1.0846 0.8294 1.2165 Estimate -0.0542 0.9989 0.9608
Standard Error 0.4264 0.0556 0.0714 Standard Error 0.8691 0.1134 0.1455 Standard Error 0.3245 0.0423 0.0544
t-value -1.2144 20.2248 12.6263 t-value 1.2480 7.3153 8.3581 t-value -0.1669 23.5953 17.6784
Friendsivory&Sime (FP) Merrill Lynch Balanced
Estimate 0.3064 0.9484 1.0126 Estimate 0.1192 0.9448 0.9490
Standard Error 0.6522 0.0851 0.1092 Standard Error 0.4030 0.0526 0.0675
t-value 0.4697 11.1464 9.2700 t-value 0.2958 17.9711 14.0602
    The statistics show how, on average, the funds have been keeping very
close tracks to the market. Indeed, both regression coefficients have a mean
around 0.98, which indicates that on average, a one unit increase or fall in
the market’s excess returns would result in a 0.98 increase or fall in the
funds’ excess returns. Hence, any positive or negative shock over our sample
period seem to be transmitted almost entirely to the funds, which do not
appear to have possessed over that period any information that would have
allowed them to time the market. This is also evident when one notices how
small the interquartile range, where 50% of the funds lie, is in both cases:
0.0905 when the market is up and 0.1295 when it is down. Next, we
consider each market state separately in order to perform a more thorough
analysis of the timing behaviour exhibited by the funds.
TABLE 5
The descriptive statistics of the regression coefficients of the two beta model
uβ dβ
Mean 0.9852 0.9799
Standard error 0.0126 0.0174
Standard deviation 0.0835 0.1154
Sample variance 0.0070 0.0133
Excess Kurtosis 0.9911 2.3808
Skewness -0.5889 1.0416
Range 0.4189 0.6156
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Count 44 44
Minimum value 0.7176 0.7796
1st quartile (25th percentile) 0.9402 0.9010
Median 0.9953 0.9760
3rd quartile (75th percentile) 1.0307 1.0305
Maximum value 1.1365 1.3953
Jarque-Bera Statistic 4.3445 18.3471
Probability 0.1139 0.0001
Correlation ( uβ , dβ )
-0.0779
    When the market is up, 75% of the funds had a regression coefficient that
lay below 1.0307, which indicates that 75% of the sample funds did not
exhibit signs of timing behaviour when the market was doing well. The
difference between the top and the bottom quartile is also worth noting; the
top quartile of the regression coefficient uβ  starts from 1.0307 to 1.1365, the
range being equal to 0.1058, while the bottom quartile’s range is 0.2226,
starting from uβ = 0.7176 to 0.9402. Hence, the results of the bottom quartile
of funds were even more dramatic, not only evidence of no special timing
skills possessed by the fund managers but also of underperformance relative
to the market. This also confirmed by noting that the uβ  are actually
negatively skewed.
    On the other hand, when the market was down, 75% of the funds’ dβ  lay
above 0.9010. Indeed, the funds seem to have performed as worse as the
market when it was passing through a downturn, with 25% of the funds
performing even worse with their dβ  ranging from 1.0305 to 1.3953. This is
even more evident when one compares the ranges of the top vs. bottom
quartile: 0.3648 vs. 0.1214 and when one notes that the dβ s are positively
skewed. Hence, the fund managers were not able to game on any extra
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information to time the market and on average, they performed worse than
the market when the latter was falling.
    Consequently, in both states, the funds managers on average do not appear
to have possessed any special information that could allow them to time the
market and produce any excess returns. The very negligible correlation
(-0.0779) between the two coefficients confirms this: If fund managers did
possess special timing skills, one would expect it to be a significantly high
negative number. However, it is worth noting that by examining the results
for each individual funds, some of them did exhibit some timing skills such
as, when the market was up, Friends Ivory&Sime and Swiss life with their
uβ  respectively equal to 1.1249 and 1.1365, and in the case where the
market was down, Gartmore and Cazanove concentrated with their dβ  equal
to 0.7897 and 0.7796 respectively.
    Finally, to see more clearly that for our sample of funds in the 10-year
period under study, the timing abilities of the managers are not very
impressive, we present the next figure where the coefficients are plotted for
illustration purposes:
0
0.2
0.4
0.6
0.8
1
1.2
0 0.2 0.4 0.6 0.8 1 1.2 1.4 1.6
Figure 1
uβ
dβ
34
A plot of the two-beta model regression’s coefficients
    In case of special timing skills from the fund mangers in both states, one
would expect the coefficients to be clustered in the top left corner of the
graph, with a high uβ  and low dβ . But, as one can see in the graph, for our
sample period, the evidence is not for strong timing skills exhibited by the
fund managers.
    Now that the data has been analysed using various methods, this article
can now move to applying the newly derived LPW measure to the empirical
data and analysing the performance of the 44 British pension fund managers
for two different cases: first, the investor is considered to be risk-averse
upward and risk-loving downward (0< 1v <1 and 0< 2v <1) while in the second
case he is taken to be risk-loving upward and risk-averse downward ( 1v >1
and 2v >1). The results will be compared to the evaluation performed in the
above section using the six different measures, in the aim of discovering
whether the LPW does capture new information. As a first step toward
achieving this, the next section discusses these two approaches and derives
all the necessary parameters needed to apply them to our data.
4.4 Derivation of essential parameters for the empirical application of the
LPW performance measure
    To apply the LPW performance measure to our sample of active fund
managers, for the two cases discussed earlier, we first need to determine the
relevant parameters of the loss aversion utility function 21 ,vv  and λ , while
satisfying one of the main conditions of the theory,
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, and while keeping a value for the proportion
invested in equity, θ 11, that corresponded to the one prevalent in the UK
market.
    To achieve that, this study devised and solved the following minimisation
problem: Finding the values of 21 ,vv  and λ  that minimise the weighted sum
of the excess returns of the benchmark portfolio∑
=
T
t
tBt rw
1
~~ subject to the
condition that 75.0=θ 12, 21 ,vv  and λ being positive and finally that 012 >− vv .
The last condition is imposed in order to ensure that the investor displays a
rational behaviour; indeed, Hwang and Satchell (2003) proved in their article
that if the investor possesses a loss aversion utility function and one wants to
assume that θ  is an increasing function of p , i.e. that as the probability of
equity outperforming the risk-free asset increases, the investor would
increase his holdings in equity which is considered to be a rational decision,
then 12 vv −  must be >0.
    Additional conditions are imposed depending on the various scenarios
considered. In the first case, where the investor is assumed to be risk-averse
for gains and risk-loving for losses, 1v  and 2v  are both required to be less
than 1. The second case, on the other hand, studies an investor who is risk-
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 As mentioned earlier, the choice of a 75% investment level in the risky asset seemed a
plausible estimation of the actual level in the UK market.
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averse to losses and risk-loving for gains and thus the condition imposed in
this situation would be that 11 >v  and 12 >v .
    Next, given that they are identical for the two cases considered, the KST
parameters for the benchmark portfolio were determined using maximum
likelihood estimation and the results obtained were as follows:
TABLE 6
The estimates of the KST parameters for the Caps pooled median
         1α     1λ                  2α             2λ            p
Estimates 1.7089 0.2555 1.4086 0.2349 0.7
Standard Error 0.4125 0.0715 0.5442 0.1086
t-statistic 4.1428 3.5734 2.5884 2.1629
    Using these results, we can now move to determining the relevant
parameters necessary to the application of each individual scenario of the
LPW performance measure.
For the first case considered, where the investor is assumed to be risk-averse
for gains and risk-loving for losses, solving the minimisation problem to
calculate the correspondent parameters for the loss aversion utility function
with 1v  and 2v  both required to be less than 1, gives the following values:
1.01 =v , 2.02 =v  and 0950.2=λ . The resulting figure for the weighted sum of
the benchmark’s excess returns, ∑
=
T
t
tBt rw
1
~~
, is equal to 4109154.4 −× , which is
an acceptable low level that is very close to 0.
The second scenario analysed in this article is one that considers an investor
who is who is risk-averse to losses and risk-loving for gains. Given all the
tools necessary to solve the minimisation problem for 11 >v  and 12 >v  are
available, the solution is readily obtained: 6585.11 =v , 7214.12 =v  and
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3392.2=λ , with the weighted sum of the benchmark’s excess returns
∑
=
T
t
tBt rw
1
~~ being equal to the extremely negligible figure of 8100944.1 −×− .
    Now, that the two LPW performance measure’s settings have clearly
defined and that all the necessary parameters have been calculated, the next
section applies these two methods to assess the performance of the funds in
our sample data and proposes a thorough analysis of the results obtained.
5. Empirical application of the LPW performance measure
5.1 For an investor who is risk-averse to gains and risk-loving to losses
    In this section, we apply the newly modified LPW measure to evaluate the
performance of 44 UK funds over a 10-year sample period (March 1990 to
December 1999), under the assumption that the investor is risk-averse to
gains and risk-loving to losses, i.e. that 10 1 << v  and 10 2 << v .
    This choice is motivated by the many empirical results that were reported
across the literature. Indeed, as early as Fishburn and Kochenberger (1979),
evidence were presented to indicate that 10 1 << v  and 10 2 << v . Indeed,
when empirically evaluating the two-piece utility function of individuals
when faced with changes over wealth, Fishburn and Kochenberger (1979)
found evidence that investors are risk-averse for gains and risk-loving for
losses, i.e. that 10 1 << v  and 10 2 << v , and also cited many other references
that confirm their reports. In addition, Kahneman and Tversky (1992) used a
nonlinear regression procedure to estimate the values for these parameters
for various subjects and discovered that the median value is equal to 0.88,
for both gains and losses. It is worth noting that having the investor to be
risk-loving for losses is a behaviour that has been discussed in the literature
and has been called by Kahneman and Tversky (1992) as “risk-seeking”.
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Indeed, when it applies to losses, it refers to an intuitive behaviour that was
pointed out by Kahneman and Tversky (1979) in a series of experiments
they conducted: it implies than individuals prefer a loss that is merely
probable to a smaller loss that is certain.
    Using the values obtained in section 4.4 to calculate the positive weight
vector and the methodology outlined in the previous sections, this article
presents in table 7 the performance scores for the 44 funds over the 10-year
sample period as well as their relevant statistics.
    At first, the results reported in table 7 seem to indicate that the LPW
performance evaluation of our sample of funds is distinct from the measures
discussed in section 4.2: the LPW measure results seem to detect signs of
abnormal performance and indicate slightly better skills from the fund
managers.
TABLE 7
The LPW performance measure results and their descriptive statistics
calculated for 44 UK funds over the 10-year period (March1990-December1999)
Equitable Spec. Sits. -2.8031 Legal & Generali -0.1222 Friends Ivory &Sime 0.3459
(-1.3948) (-0.6446) (0.5894)
London Life -1.1817 Swiss Life Index -0.1039 Equitable High Income 0.3878
(-2.3129) (-0.2814) (0.3601)
Winterthur Life -1.1545 Royal Sunalliance -0.1006 Friends I&S Stewardship 0.4854
(-1.5445) (-0.1703) (0.3548)
Equitable Pelican -0.9095 Legal & Generalp -0.0054 Cazenove Concentrated 0.4917
(-1.4796) (-0.0220) (0.5041)
Dresdner RCM -0.6978 Guardian 0.0028 Govett 0.5583
(-0.7097) (0.0031) (0.5928)
Morley (was GA) -0.4979 Standard Life 0.0105 Gartmore 0.6181
(-1.2463) (0.0313) (0.7489)
Invesco UK Core -0.4181 Morley (was CU) 0.0118 Clerical Medical 0.6334
(-0.3758) (0.0256) (1.4164)
Colonial -0.4032 SLC Asset Management 0.0144 Deutsche 0.8105
(-0.6880) (0.0336) (1.2414)
Axa Sun Life -0.3995 Hill Samuel 0.0883 Swiss Life 0.8298
(-0.9332) (0.2463) (0.6159)
Friendsivory&Sime -0.2753 Henderson 0.1108 National Mutual Life 0.9270
(-0.3424) (0.2425) (1.4997)
Prudential M&G -0.2625 Aegon 0.1244 Friendsivory&Sime (FP) 1.1211
(-0.6838) (0.2323) (1.3088)
Scottish Life -0.2429 Northern Trust 0.1860 Britannic Inv. Managers 1.4776
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(-0.8129) (0.2060) (2.8878)
Merrill Lynch Balanced -0.2035 KQEP Enhanced 0.2124 Martin Currie UK Growth 1.9332
(-0.3790) (0.6667) (1.6777)
Gartmore/Natwest Index -0.1555 Morley PP(Was NU) 0.2347 ABN AMRO 4.1086
(-0.8036) (0.4540) (1.6098)
Invesco -0.1449 Zurich Scudder 0.2800
(-0.7138) (0.6204)
Descriptive Statistics:
Mean 0.1346 Minimum value -2.8031
Standard Error 0.1464 1st quartile (25th percentile) -0.2478
Standard deviation 0.9708 Median (50th percentile) 0.0131
Sample variance 0.9425 3rd quartile (75th percentile) 0.4870
Excess kurtosis 6.3093 Maximum value 4.1086
Skewness 1.1105
Range 6.9117 Jarque-Bera Statistic 81.1227
Count 44 Probability 0.0000
    Indeed, they show that the magnitude of the abnormal performance for the
44 funds over the 10-year period under study varies from about –2.8031% to
4.1086%. The median fund is characterised by an abnormal performance
close to 0.0131%, and hence the funds are nearly split in half between under-
and out-performers. The mean of the performance measures, which is equal
to 0.1346%, lies in the third quartile.
    Examining the centre of the distribution of these results, we see that the
third quartile range is equal to 0.4739% while the second quartile range is
equal 0.2608, and consequently the level of outperformance is higher than
the magnitude of the underperformance, a result confirmed in table 7 where
the performance scores are reported to be positively skewed. Indeed, the
interquartile range is equal to 0.7347%, a significant number. We finally
note that the top 25% of funds beat the benchmark by a margin ranging from
half a percent to 4.1086%, which is quite a good result given that we are
considering net returns.
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    Looking at the t-statistics13 presented below each LPW result, it is
however evident that most of the results presented in table 7 are not
statistically significant. Indeed, from the 25 funds that outperformed the
benchmark, only 6 exhibit statistically significant results at the 10%
significance level. On the other hand, from the 19 funds that
underperformed, only 4 funds possess statistically significant LPWs.
    However, it is very worth noting that those significant performances
occurred at the two extremes of the distribution. Indeed, the 6 significant
outperformers all lie in the fourth quartile, at the far end of the distribution’s
positive tail, with values between 0.6334% and 4.1086%, while the 4
significant underperformers lie at the opposite side, at the far end of the
distribution’s negative tail, with values ranging from –0.9095% and
–2.8031%. Compared to the mean, 0.1346%, or the median, 0.0131%, those
values are quite extreme. Hence, the funds that did actually perform
significantly differently from the benchmark went all the way. In addition,
given the high level of excess kurtosis shown in table 7, the distribution of
the LPW does seem to possess thick tails, and thus the probability of
actually obtaining extreme values could be fairly high.
    In conclusion, a significant portion of the funds considered exhibit
performance that is very close in magnitude to the benchmark. However, the
few that actually have shown evidence of significantly distinct performance,
                                                
13
 The t-statistic for the LPW measure is calculated using the definition by Grinblatt and
Titman (1995). It is considered as having a t-distribution with T-K-1 degrees of freedom,
where T is the number of returns and K the number of benchmarks used. The t-statistic is
equal to ∑ 22 twsPPW , where s is the standard error of the Jensen regression for the fund
being evaluated.
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exhibited strong results, whether positive or negative. Indeed, they are
extreme values that lie at both far ends of the distribution.
However, care should be taken in considering the above results: one should
not forget how noisy the returns generally are, a fact that could lead to biases
in the statistical power of the tests.
    Having examined in details the results exhibited by the LPW measure in
the case of an investor who is risk-averse for gains and risk-loving for gains,
this section can now move to their analysis relative to the results reported by
conventional measures. Indeed, as mentioned earlier, the results reported in
table 7 seem to indicate that the LPW does pick up new information, as its
evaluation of our sample of funds’ performance appeared to be distinct from
the results of the various measures considered earlier. To see this more
clearly, table 8 compares the LPW performance measure with the six
preliminary measures considered in section 4.2 by presenting their
correlation matrix:
TABLE 8
The correlations between the performance results as measured by the seven different performance measures
LPW Measure
PW
Measure
Jensen
Measure
T-M
measure
Sharpe
ratio
Sortino
ratio
Inf.
ratio
120,110 <<<< vv
LPW
( 120,110 <<<< vv ) 1
PW (Power utility 0.7221 1
Jensen measure 0.7499 0.9965 1
Treynor-Mazuy measure 0.7527 0.9953 0.9999 1
Sharpe ratio 0.7722 0.9204 0.9257 0.9258 1
Sortino ratio 0.4913 0.6216 0.6178 0.6168 0.7342 1
Information ratio 0.5455 0.7196 0.7235 0.7238 0.8263 0.9290 1
    According to the correlations presented in the above table, the LPW does
seem able to detect different aspects of the management efforts as it gives
different results from all the six traditional measures considered. Indeed,
while the correlations between the Jensen, the Treynor-Mazuy and the
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Sharpe ratio are very high (all above 90%), the LPW measure exhibits the
lowest correlation with each of the other measures, ranging from 0.4913
with the Sortino ratio to 0.7722 with the Sharpe ratio. Consequently, the
LPW could be actually picking up evidence of managers’ abilities, where the
other measures are failing to do.
    In fact, in this study, the correlation between the Jensen measure and our
modified LPW measure is quite low, a result that contrasts with the very
high correlation between the Jensen measure and the PW measure. As a
result, it is possible that the use of the loss aversion utility function instead
of the power utility function, enabled the LPW to better detect the funds that
possess timing abilities, and hence to produce different results than the
Jensen measure and the other traditional measures considered. To test that
claim, we choose to study four funds, for which the evaluation given by the
LPW measure was significantly distinct from the Jensen measure’s
inferences: Britannic Inv. Managers, Guardian, Martin Currie UK Growth
and National Mutual Life. The results for these four funds are reproduced in
table 9.
    Indeed, while the LPW measure attributed for Britannic a positive and
highly significant performance above the benchmark, the PW measure, the
Jensen measure and the Treynor-Mazuy measure did not detect such strong
behaviour: although they are positive, the results are all relatively small and
only significant for the Jensen and Treynor-Mazuy at the 10% level of
significance. The Sharpe ratio as well is negligible. The Sortino and
information ratios on the other hand seem to agree with the LPW measure
since they are fairly high, placing the fund in the top quartile of the funds.
TABLE 9
The abnormal performance results of the four funds to be studied
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           LPW          PW             Jensen           T-M           Sharpe      Sortino      Inform.
      LA utility       Power utility    Measure      Measure        Ratio         Ratio     Ratio
 120,110 <<<< vv
Britannic Inv. Managers 1.4776 0.2627 0.312517 0.319900 0.0618 0.8083 0.7118
(2.8878) (1.1387) (1.364875) (1.396583)
Guardian 0.0028 -1.1028 -1.01286 -0.998300 -0.0273 -0.1071 -0.1747
(0.0031) (-2.6704) (-2.470352) (-2.434163)
Martin Currie UK Growth 1.9332 -0.1807 -0.044624 -0.028001 0.0015 0.0059 0.0084
(1.6777) (-0.3478) (-0.086515) (-0.054280)
National Mutual Life 0.9270 -0.1778 -0.149426 -0.145325 -0.0127 -0.0886 -0.1233
(1.4997) (-0.6380) (-0.540040) (-0.525176)
    
    As for Guardian, The PW measure, the Jensen measure and the Treynor-
Mazuy measure clearly concluded that it underperformed the benchmark in a
very significant way. The results are indeed large, negative and highly
significant at the 5% level of significance. Similarly, the Sharpe ratio is
extremely small and places the fund in the bottom quartile while the Sortino
and the information ratios are both negative (in the second quartile). On the
other hand, the LPW assigned a very negligible and insignificant value to the
performance of the Guardian; indeed, according to the LPW measure, this
particular fund did not underperform the benchmark, it merely performed the
same way.
    For the last two funds, the results are very controversial as well. Indeed,
looking at the LPW scores, one can conclude that the funds did fairly well
compared to the benchmark: they both outperformed the Caps pooled
median by 1.9332% and 0.9270% respectively, with the results being
significant at the 10% significance level. However, examining the Jensen
measure’s results, one obtains a different analysis: it attributes to both these
funds negative results that are not significant at any relevant levels. The
same results apply for both the Treynor-Mazuy and the PW measures.
Furthermore, the Martin Currie UK growth fund exhibits very negligible
Sharpe, Sortino and Information ratios while the National Mutual Life is
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characterised by a highly small Sharpe and Sortino ratios and a negative
Information ratio. Both funds are placed in the second quartile by these three
measures of performance. Hence whereas the LPW measure identified both
these funds as significant outperformers, the other measures evidently did
not detect any abnormal performance from their part.
    In summary, for each of the above funds, the LPW attributed to it a better
performance relative to the other measures. Britannic, which was classified
as an average performer by the other measures, was assigned an above-the-
benchmark performance by the LPW measure. Guardian, which was clearly
identified as an underperformer by the traditional measures, was found to be
an average performing fund by the LPW measure. Finally, the last two funds
were attributed no significant performance by the six different measures (if
any performance was picked up, it was a negative one) but were however
classified as significant outperformers by the LPW. Could these
discrepancies be due to the fact that the PW measure combined with a loss
aversion utility function to make the LPW measure was in fact able to pick
up some timing behaviour exhibited by the fund managers over the sample
period, a behaviour that made their performance stand out?
    A plot of the returns of the funds under consideration against the market14
should give us an indication of the relative performance of the four funds
over the sample period. As an example, we present the result obtained for
Guardian:
                                                
14
 The market proxy used in this study is the FT all share. We note here that over our
sample period, the FT all share and the Caps pooled median returns were nearly perfectly
correlated, 0.998055.
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Figure 2
A plot of the returns of Guardian against the market, the FT all share, over our sample period.
    The results show that all funds seem to have followed the market quite
closely. Indeed, the above graph, as well as the graphs of the other three
funds, do not show very strong signs of active management or timing skills:
The funds’ returns mimic the market returns most of the time over this 10-
year period. However, if any behaviour can be detected from the graphs, it is
actually reflecting bad managerial skills, as one can very distinctly see
various points at which the particular funds underperformed the market
when the market was down. This coincides with the traditional measures
performance evaluation and not the LPW’s. Next, in table 10, we calculate
the correlations between the excess returns of the four funds under study and
the FT all share or the Caps pooled median.
    The magnitudes of the results are again extremely striking (all above
90%). The funds returns’ series are very highly correlated with the market
always moving in the same direction, which coincides with the earlier
graphs.
TABLE 10
The correlations between the excess returns of the four funds
under study and the market over the sample period
                                                            Martin Currie     National
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                                                 Caps             FT          Britannic       Guardian      UK Growth     Mutual Life
Caps pooled median 1 0.9981 0.9866 0.9697 0.9325 0.9790
FT all share 1 0.9837 0.9679 0.9180 0.9795
Britannic 1 0.9609 0.9194 0.9695
Guardian 1 0.9078 0.9559
Martin Currie UK Growth 1 0.9154
National Mutual Life 1
    Hence, the four funds don’t seem to have under- or out-perform the
market significantly over the period under study. To understand these results
even better, we re-examine the two-beta model results presented in section
4.3, which are very simple but fair indicators of the timing behaviour of the
various managers under consideration. Indeed, if the LPW is picking timing
behaviour, this should be reflected in the two-beta model regression results.
Looking back at table 4, the results do not show any strong evidence of
timing skills from the fund managers of the four funds under study. Indeed,
in the case where the market up, the only fund that exhibit signs of market
timing behaviour is Guardian, whose regression coefficients lie in the top
25% of funds at 1.1087. On the other hand, Martin Currie UK Growth
exhibit a very low coefficient uβ , at 0.8294, which lies in the bottom
quartile of funds, whereas the Britannnic and National Mutual Life funds
exhibit a uβ  that is very close to 1, at around 0.97, that lie in the second
quartile. The results are even more extreme in the case where the market was
down. Indeed, they seem to indicate that the fund managers of these
particular funds seem to have actually exhibited weak timing skills: the four
funds exhibit quite high dβ , which lie all in the top quartile of funds, with
Guardian possessing the highest dβ  out of the 44 funds at 1.3953.
    In conclusion, the inferences given by the two-beta model regression are
in accordance with the traditional measures’ conclusions and seem to
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disagree with the LPW scores. But, if the funds are not exhibiting any
special skills, then what is causing the discrepancy in the results, which are
making the LPW associate better performance with the funds under study?
Why does the LPW measure contrary to all the rest of the measures attribute
this significantly better performance to our sample of funds? In an attempt to
answer these puzzling questions and explain this inconsistency, this article
reviewed carefully the details of the theory and calculations behind the LPW
measure.
    Indeed, a detailed analysis of the LPW measure’s theory and derivation
methodology shed the light on a possible shortcoming that, in this particular
case, is behind the difference in the results. It is mainly due to the
combination of the properties of the loss aversion utility function, the
construction of the PW measure and the particular assumptions about the
investor preferences that were made in this section.
    More precisely, in conducting the performance evaluation of the sample
of funds under study, this section assumed that the investor is risk-averse to
gains and risk-loving to losses, an assumption that meant for the loss
aversion utility function that 10 1 << v  and 10 2 << v . Now, recalling the
particular structure of the loss aversion utility function,
            1
1)( vXXU v= if 0>X
                     = 2
2)( vX v−λ if 0≤X
where X represents the gains, we can see that the above assumption
translates into a potential problem when considering the marginal utilities of
the loss aversion utility function,
            
)( tLA XU ′    = 11−vtX if 0>tX
      =
12)( −− vtXλ   if 0≤tX              (23)
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since, when 10 1 << v  and 10 2 << v , we have that 011 <−v  and 012 <−v  and
hence,
            
)( tLA XU ′    = 111 vtX − if 0>tX
       =
21)( vtX −−λ             if 0≤tX              (24)
    As the gains represented by X become smaller and closer to 0, the
marginal utilities increase toward infinity:   ∞→′
→
)(
0 tLAtX
XULim
     The following graph illustrates the behaviour of the loss aversion utility
function and its marginal utility around 0, in the case of an investor who is
assumed to be risk-averse to gains ( 10 1 << v ) and risk-loving to losses
( 10 2 << v ):
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Figure 3
The LA utility function for an investor who is risk-averse for gains and risk -loving for losses
0,)( 11 >= XifvXXu v  and  0,)()( 22 ≤−−= XifvXXu vλ ,
for 1.01 =v , 2.02 =v and 0965.2=λ
    Given that when applying the LPW measure, the marginal utilities of the
loss aversion function are used as period weights, this discovery made this
study re-analyse the calculation behind the vector of weights obtained under
these specific conditions and re-examine it in details to determine whether
49
this particular behaviour is responsible for the discrepancies in the
performance results reported by the LPW. We remind the reader quickly of
the expression derived for the weight vector in section 3.3:
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As one can notice from the above expression, if, in quarter t, the gains tX
are around 0, and the investor is assumed to be risk-averse to gains
( 10 1 << v ) and risk-loving to losses ( 10 2 << v ), the marginal utility of tX  in
that quarter will be large and thus the weight for that quarter will
automatically be large as well. Consequently, when using this weight vector
to assess the performance of fund i , following the relevant formula,
∑= t ittLA RwLPW , its performance in this quarter t will be heavily weighted
and hence responsible for a big part of its overall performance evaluation.
    Next, this study attempts to discover whether such anomaly has occurred
while calculating the weighting vector for our benchmark by presenting in
table 11 the details of the procedure behind the derivation of the weighting
vector, quarter by quarter.
       Examining carefully the numbers in the latter table, we notice that in the
quarter March 92, the gains X of the benchmark portfolio - the Caps pooled
median - are nearest to 0, at –0.1156. This level was low enough to drive the
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marginal utility to its highest point at 11.7688, which constitutes almost one-
third of the sum of the marginal utility vector over the 40 quarters. However,
what is most worth noting is how large is the weight associated with that
quarter, 0.3529, relative to the other 39 quarters weights which are
extremely small. Consequently, any fund that performed well (bad) in that
quarter, will be attributed a high performance measure, even if it did not
perform well (bad) overall. And so, what the LPW is mainly picking up in
this case is the performance of each particular fund in the quarter where the
benchmark’s performance was very close to the risk-free asset. If the fund
performed well in that quarter relative to the risk-free asset, then it will be
associated with a high overall score; if it did not, then its score will be
significantly lower.
TABLE 11
Calculation of the weight vector for an investor with a LA utility function,
1.01 =v , 2.02 =v , 0965.2=λ and 75.0=θ
      Quarter                    ftr                tcapsR             ftrtcapsR −                  tX                          tu′                  tw
        _______                    ____                 _______              ___________                ____                       ____                        ____
Mar-1990  1.2148% -5.5000% -6.7149% -5.0361% 0.5748 0.0172
Jun-1990 1.2005 6.0000 4.7995 3.5996 0.3158 0.0095
Sep-1990 1.1914 -16.5000 -17.6914 -13.2686 0.2648 0.0079
Dec-1990 1.1172 8.0000 6.8828 5.1621 0.2283 0.0068
Mar-1991 0.9635 16.7000 15.7365 11.8023 0.1085 0.0033
Jun-1991 0.8932 -1.7000 -2.5933 -1.9449 1.2305 0.0369
Sep-1991 0.8073 10.0000 9.1927 6.8945 0.1759 0.0053
Dec-1991 0.8438 -5.7000 -6.5438 -4.9078 0.5868 0.0176
Mar-1992 0.8542 0.7000 -0.1542 -0.1156 11.7688 0.3529
Jun-1992 0.7865 5.8000 5.0135 3.7602 0.3036 0.0091
Sep-1992 0.6927 -0.5000 -1.1927 -0.8945 2.2904 0.0687
Dec-1992 0.5443 14.3000 13.7557 10.3168 0.1224 0.0037
Mar-1993 0.4609 4.3000 3.8391 2.8793 0.3861 0.0116
Jun-1993 0.4453 2.7000 2.2547 1.6910 0.6233 0.0187
Sep-1993 0.4349 6.3000 5.8651 4.3988 0.2636 0.0079
Dec-1993 0.4167 11.7000 11.2833 8.4625 0.1463 0.0044
Mar-1994 0.4089 -5.6000 -6.0089 -4.5066 0.6282 0.0188
Jun-1994 0.4115 -5.5000 -5.9115 -4.4336 0.6365 0.0191
Sep-1994 0.4714 3.6000 3.1286 2.3465 0.4641 0.0139
Dec-1994 0.5156 1.5000 0.9844 0.7383 1.3140 0.0394
Mar-1995 0.5156 2.5000 1.9844 1.4883 0.6992 0.0210
Jun-1995 0.5260 6.2000 5.6740 4.2555 0.2716 0.0081
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Sep-1995 0.5469 7.9000 7.3531 5.5148 0.2151 0.0065
Dec-1995 0.5182 5.1000 4.5818 3.4363 0.3292 0.0099
Mar-1996 0.4818 3.8000 3.3182 2.4887 0.4402 0.0132
Jun-1996 0.4648 2.3000 1.8352 1.3764 0.7501 0.0225
Sep-1996 0.4688 5.7000 5.2313 3.9234 0.2922 0.0088
Dec-1996 0.5130 4.3000 3.7870 2.8402 0.3908 0.0117
Mar-1997 0.5156 5.1000 4.5844 3.4383 0.3291 0.0099
Jun-1997 0.5365 4.4000 3.8635 2.8977 0.3838 0.0115
Sep-1997 0.5807 12.8000 12.2193 9.1645 0.1362 0.0041
Dec-1997 0.6120 -0.9000 -1.5120 -1.1340 1.8945 0.0568
Mar-1998 0.6040 15.2000 14.5960 10.9470 0.1160 0.0035
Jun-1998 0.6224 -0.6000 -1.2224 -0.9168 2.2458 0.0673
Sep-1998 0.6081 -14.2000 -14.8081 -11.1061 0.3053 0.0092
Dec-1998 0.4948 14.6000 14.1052 10.5789 0.1197 0.0036
Mar-1999 0.4167 8.6000 8.1833 6.1375 0.1953 0.0059
Jun-1999 0.4010 1.9000 1.4990 1.1242 0.9000 0.0270
Sep-1999 0.4271 -4.1000 -4.5271 -3.3953 0.7879 0.0236
Dec-1999 0.4688 15.6000 15.1313 11.3484 0.1123 0.0034
                                        _________        _________
                                           33.3471                  1
    To confirm this, we analysed the performance of the four funds under
study in the quarter under question: the LPW associated with these four
funds better performance than all the other conventional measures because
in this particular quarter, March 92, these four funds performed well, a
performance that was very heavily weighted driving the overall performance
score to be very high. If one considers in details each fund’s performance,
one notices how much the performance of each fund in that quarter is
influencing the LPW overall performance result. For instance, for Britannic
Inv. Managers, the overall LPW score is equal to
%4776.1)(
40
1
=−= ∑
=t
tftBt rRwLPW , of which 70% (1.0439%) is due to quarter
March 1992; For Martin Currie UK growth, the ratio is as high as 0.93%.
    From the above numbers, we can deduce how important is the impact of
the behaviour of the loss aversion utility function, under these particular
assumptions, on the overall results. Any fund that performed well relative to
the risk-free rate in a quarter where the benchmark performance was very
close to the risk-free asset (as in quarter March 1992), will be attributed a
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better performance by the LPW given the large weight associated with that
quarter. However, it is worth noting that this shortcoming will happen only
under these particular settings: the investor is assumed to be risk-averse to
gains ( 10 1 << v ) and risk-loving to losses ( 10 2 << v ), and in a particular
quarter, the benchmark’s excess returns must be close to 0.
    In the next section, this problem is overcome, since the performance of
the 44 UK funds are evaluated for a different investor, in attempt to capture
all sides of this newly modified performance measure.
5.2 For an investor who is risk-averse to losses and risk-loving to gains
   Given the calculations and the methodology outlined in the previous
sections, we can evaluate the performance of our sample of 44 UK pension
funds, for the 10-year period under study, using the LPW measure for an
investor who is risk-averse to losses ( 6585.11 =v ) and risk-loving to gains
( 7214.12 =v ). The results and their descriptive statistics are presented in table
12.
    The results show that on average, the performance evaluation results
presented by the LPW in this section, under the particular conditions
imposed, is quite similar to the results proposed by the conventional
measures. It seems that for the conditions imposed in this section, the LPW
measure does not share the problem that it encountered in section 5.1, for an
investor who is risk-averse to gains and risk-loving to losses ( 10 1 << v  and
10 2 << v ).
    Indeed, the average abnormal performance is quite negligible at 0.0483%
and lies in the second quartile of funds. The second and the third quartile are
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very narrow, with the interquartile range only equal to 0.3827%.
Particularly, the second quartile span a range equal to 0.2349% below the
median while for the third quartile, this value is only equal to 0.1478%.
These figures first indicate that 50% of the funds’ performances lie in a very
small range around a median of 0.1115% and thus at least half the funds
show signs of negligible abnormal performance. Second, they show that the
results are slightly negatively skewed, as confirmed by the skewness level
reported in table 12.
TABLE 12
The LPW performance measure results calculated for
44 UK funds over the 10-year period, with 11 >v  and 12 >v
Equitable Spec. Sits. -1.8861 Govett 0.0161 Morley (was GA) 0.2239
(-1.7783) (0.0324) (1.0622)
Guardian -1.4380 Britannic Inv. Managers 0.0325 Zurich Scudder 0.2310
(-2.9743) (0.1205) (0.9699)
Winterthur Life -0.8910 AXA Sun Life 0.0491 Swiss Life Index 0.2403
(-2.2587) (0.2173) (1.2329)
Equitable High Income -0.8802 Legal & Generalp 0.0674 Morley PP (Was NU) 0.3164
(-1.5490) (0.5228) (1.1596)
Colonial -0.6960 Henderson 0.0806 Hill Samuel 0.3483
(-2.2502) (0.3342) (1.8400)
Martin Currie UK Growth -0.6119 Legal & Generali 0.0977 Clerical Medical 0.3533
(-1.0062) (0.9764) (1.4969)
Equitable Pelican -0.5261 INVESCO 0.1084 KQEP Enhanced 0.3789
(-1.6219) (1.0120) (2.2533)
Invesco UK Core -0.5027 Gartmore/Natwest Index 0.1146 Friends I&S Stewardship 0.4071
(-0.8561) (1.1227) (0.5638)
Morley (was CU) -0.4817 AEGON 0.1596 Friends Ivory & Sime 0.6460
(-1.9867) (0.5649) (2.0859)
National Mutual Life -0.2874 Friendsivory&Sime (FP) 0.1709 Gartmore 0.8357
(-0.8810) (0.3781) (1.9187)
Northern Trust -0.1981 Royal Sunalliance 0.1791 Deutsche 0.8669
(-0.4158) (0.5747) (2.5161)
Friendsivory&Sime(I&S) -0.0980 Standard Life 0.1872 Cazenove Concentrated 0.9139
(-0.2310) (1.0600) (1.7757)
Prudential M&G -0.0794 Dresdner RCM 0.2171 Swiss Life 1.0516
(-0.3918) (0.4184) (1.4790)
Scottish Life -0.0628 Merrill Lynch Balanced 0.2199 ABN AMRO 2.0320
(-0.3981) (0.7762) (1.5086)
SLC Asset Management -0.0010 London Life 0.2203
(-0.0046) (0.8171)
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Descriptive Statistics:
Mean 0.0483 Minimum value -1.8861
Standard Error 0.0973 1st quartile (25th percentile) -0.1230
Standard deviation 0.6456 Median (50th percentile) 0.1115
Sample variance 0.4168 3rd quartile (75th percentile) 0.2593
Excess kurtosis 2.3756 Maximum value 2.0320
Skewness -0.2188
Range 3.9180 Jarque-Bera Statistic 10.5374
Count 44 Probability 0.0047
    On the other hand, the results reported in the two extreme quartiles are
definitely more interesting. Indeed, the top 25% covers a range of 1.7726%,
starting with Morley PP (was NU) at 0.3164% till Abn Amro whose excess
returns over the period under study were equal to 2.0319%. Similarly, the
bottom quartile of funds performance covered a quite similar range, equal to
1.7627%. This finding, combined with the low level of skewness reported in
table 12, seems to indicate a symmetrical distribution to the performance
results. In addition, compared to the low average abnormal performance at
0.0484% and the median at 0.1115%, these values are reasonably high.
Hence, as in the previous sections, the funds that did outperform or
underperform the benchmark did it in a significant and quite extreme way.
This is confirmed if one examines carefully the performance scores of the
funds in the top and bottom quartiles since one discovers that these results
are quite robust: all the statistically significant performance results reported
in table 12 lie in either of these two quartiles. As a matter of fact, out of the
16 funds that possess an abnormal performance score that is significant at
the 10% significance level, seven lie in the bottom quartile with a negative
abnormal performance and nine lie in the top quartile with positive excess
returns. In addition, the t-statistics reported for these 16 funds are the largest,
when compared with the other measures.
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    In summary, reviewing the performance evaluation reported by the LPW
measure for 11 >v and 12 >v , one reaches the following conclusions: on
average, the abnormal performance of the funds over the period under study
is negligible. Indeed, more than 60% of the funds present negligible and
non-statistically significant excess returns but, the results reported in the top
quartile do give evidence of some funds performing significantly well
relative to the benchmark. Finally, here as well, we need to note that the
given the nature of the returns data, one has to be very careful in considering
the statistical power of the tests performed.
        Next, to evaluate even better the performance evaluation reported by
the LPW measure under this section’s special setting, we compare it to the
performance assessment as made by the traditional and conventional
measures discussed earlier, in section 4.2. Examining the results more
carefully, the LPW measure in this section exhibits much closer performance
assessment to the traditional measures than in the case of an investor who is
risk-loving for losses and risk-averse for gains ( 10,10 21 <<<< vv ).
Furthermore, for many funds, the performance scores reported by the LPW
measure in this section are much more statistically robust and slightly higher
in absolute value: more funds exhibit statistically significant abnormal
performance, with higher magnitudes as well. The similarity in the
performance evaluation of our sample of funds by the LPW considered in
this section and the six more traditional measures’ results is even more
obvious as one studies their correlation matrix in the next table:
TABLE 13
The correlations between abnormal performance as measured by the LPW
with  11 >v  and 12 >v , and the six different conventional performance measures
LPW
Measure
LPW
Measure
PW
Measure
Jensen
Measure
T-M
measure
Sharpe
ratio
Sortino
ratio
Infor.
ratio
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12,11 >> vv 120,110 <<<< vv
LPW  ( 12,11 >> vv ) 1 0.6164 0.9599 0.9350 0.9305 0.8590 0.6080 0.6715
   The first four measures reported in the above table possess very high
correlation, all above 0.93%. Indeed, the LPW measure for an investor who
is risk-averse to losses and risk-loving for gains, with 11 >v  and 12 >v , seem
to share the highest correlation with the PW measure and then with the
Jensen and the Treynor-Mazuy measures, which indicates how close their
respective performance evaluation of the various funds in our sample is. The
LPW measure in this section is also fairly closely related with the Sharpe
ratio, their correlation being around 0.86%. However, it does exhibit low
correlation with the last two measures, the Sortino and the Information ratio,
the lowest being with the Sortino ratio; as analysed previously, this is due to
the difference in each of these measures representation of the risk entailed
by the fund manager.
    Finally, the ranking of the funds in the two extreme quartiles gives an
additional indication on how much these measures agree on the performance
evaluation of the funds with the most significant abnormal performance. In
fact, the importance of the performance of the funds in the top and bottom
quartiles was noted earlier as most interesting; as a result, we compare next
these two quartiles for the various measures considered. In the bottom
quartile, the LPW measure, with 11 >v  and 12 >v , has the most funds in
common with the PW measure: the same ten funds are placed in the bottom
25% of funds. This number drops to nine and eight funds, respectively, when
the Jensen measure and the Sharpe ratio are considered. As expected, the
Sortino and the Information ratio have only 7 funds in common with the
LPW measure as measured in this section, placed in the bottom quartile. The
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results for the top quartile of funds are quite similar. The LPW measure has
nine funds in common with the PW measure while with the Jensen measure,
this number drops to eight, similarly to the Sharpe ratio. Finally, for the last
two measures, this number is even lower than in the case of the bottom
quartile, at six funds only.
    Hence, in conclusion, as opposed to the section 5.1, the LPW measure for
an investor who is risk-averse for losses and risk-loving for gains, with 11 >v
and 12 >v , present very similar performance evaluation to the one reported
by the conventional measures. Indeed, it does not pick up on average any
strong proof for the presence of abnormal excess returns in our sample of
funds. It does however indicate the presence some significant outperformers
in the top quartile; both extreme quartiles seem to include funds that exhibit
robust performance scores, either positive or negative.
5.3 Analysis and Comparison of the two different risk-preference
scenarios
    In this section, we compare the performance assessments of our sample of
funds that were reported by the LPW for the two different investors
discussed in the previous sections.  In fact, recalling the analysis of each
case alone and their correlations with the conventional measures evaluations,
we would expect, that results for the second case, where the investor is
assumed to be risk-averse for losses and risk-loving for gains, to be clearly
distinct from the first case where the investor considered is risk-averse for
gains and risk-loving for losses, especially given that the second case is
supposed to have overcome the shortcoming that faced the loss aversion
utility function when 1v  and 2v  were taken to be less than one.
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    Comparing the results reported in tables 7 and 12 gives a first indication
that our expectations were true: while the LPW measure’s performance
evaluation for 10 1 << v  and 10 2 << v  is evidently different from the
assessment given by the LPW measure which consider an investor who is
risk-averse for losses and risk-loving for gains. To view these differences in
a more thorough and detailed manner, we present next a comparison of the
descriptive statistics of each measure, as well as the correlation between
them:
TABLE 14
The descriptive statistics and correlation of the LPW performance results
for the two different preference schemes
                                                         LPW       LPW
               120,110 <<<< vv                                         12,11 >> vv
Descriptive statistics:
Mean 0.1346 0.0483
Standard Error 0.1464 0.0973
Standard Deviation 0.9708 0.6456
Sample Variance 0.9425 0.4168
Excess Kurtosis 6.3093 2.3800
Skewness 1.0538 -0.2188
Range 6.9117 3.9180
Count 44 44
Minimum value -2.8031 -1.8861
1st quartile -0.2478 -0.1230
Median 0.0131 0.1115
3rd quartile 0.4870 0.2593
Maximum 4.1086 2.0320
Jarque-Bera Statistic 81.1227 10.7354
Probability 0.0000 0.0047
Correlation 0.6164
59
    On average, It is very obvious that the LPW measure in the case of an
investor who is risk-averse for gains and risk-loving for losses ( 10 1 << v  and
10 2 << v ) attributes higher and better performance to the 44 funds in our
sample, while for the LPW for an investor who is risk-loving for gains and
risk-averse for losses ( 11 >v and 12 >v ), the results appear to be more
moderate. Indeed, the first indication of such a behaviour is the mean
performance score for these two cases, 0.1346% vs. 0.0483. The second
signal of this distinct difference is the range that the performance results
cover in these two cases: Indeed, the LPW abnormal performance results of
the top quartile of funds for 10 1 << v  and 10 2 << v  vary from 0.4870% to
4.1086%, while for 11 >v and 12 >v , the top 25% of funds beat the
benchmark from a level of 0.2593% to 2.0320%, the difference being fairly
evident. Furthermore, the correlation between these two measures presented
at the end of table 14 confirms our analysis: the dissimilarity in the
performance results reported by the two versions of the LPW measure is
quite evident due to the low correlation level between them, 0.6164.
    However, one has to remember here that in the case of the LPW for
10 1 << v  and 10 2 << v , the better performance is not rewarding any special
skills or risk-taking behaviour, but due to the special conditions under which
it was constructed15, it is more of a reward for generating positive excess
returns over the risk-free asset in a quarter where the benchmark performed
very closely to the risk-free asset. Hence, the weak correlation between these
two measures seems to suggest that the LPW measure for 11 >v and 12 >v
may be better at picking up the actual abnormal performance of the funds
under study. In fact, examining more thoroughly the results presented in
                                                
15
 Refer to the discussion presented at the end of section 5.1.
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tables 7 and 12, one can notice that the performance scores reported in by
the LPW measure for 11 >v and 12 >v , are more robust: overall, 16 funds
respectively exhibit performance that is significant at the 10% level while it
is only 10 for the LPW measure for 10 1 << v  and 10 2 << v . In addition, the
LPW measure for 11 >v and 12 >v , possess 9 funds with significant positive
abnormal performance in the top quartile. This number falls to 6 funds in the
case of the LPW for 10 1 << v  and 10 2 << v . As a result, the LPW measure
for an investor who is risk-loving for gains and risk-averse for losses
( 11 >v and 12 >v ) does have stronger and more robust performance
evaluation.
    Furthermore, the differences between these two measures are also picked
up when examining the two most important quartiles of funds where all the
significant performances lie: the bottom and top quartile of funds. Indeed,
comparing the rankings and performance scores of the eleven funds that lie
in these two extreme quartiles for the two different settings of the LPW
measure, we find that they only have 5 funds in common in the bottom
quartile and 6 in the top quartile, reconfirming the difference in the
information picked up by these two measures. More drastically, the National
Mutual Life fund who is ranked by the LPW measure for 10 1 << v  and
10 2 << v  to be in its top quartile with a positive, statistically significant at
the 10% level, abnormal performance of 0.9269%, is actually placed by the
LPW measure for 11 >v and 12 >v  in its bottom quartile with an un-
significant negative abnormal performance of -0.2874%. The last ranking is
definitely more in accordance with the evidence of no timing behaviour that
was reported for that fund, since it was characterised with a 1<uβ  and a
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1>dβ 16. Similarly, Martin Currie UK Growth fund is attributed by the LPW
measure, for 10 1 << v  and 10 2 << v , a significantly positive abnormal
performance that ranks it among the top 25% of the funds considered;
however, the LPW measure for 11 >v and 12 >v , assign to this fund an un-
significant negative abnormal performance that places it in the bottom
quartile of funds.
        In fact, looking very closely at the results in tables 7 and 12 and linking
them to the funds’ timing behaviour presented in table 4 in section 4.3, we
notice that the funds for which the LPW measures for 11 >v  and 12 >v
attributed a better (worse) performance than the LPW for 10 1 << v  and
10 2 << v , have actually exhibited some (lack of) signs of timing skills either
when the market were up or when they were down. Indeed, table 15 next
shows evidence of this claim.
TABLE 15
An analysis of the timing skills of the various funds for which the performance results
reported by the two settings of the LPW measure were significantly distinct
                                  LPW                     LPW                          
u
β                         
d
β
            
120,110 <<<< vv     12,11 >> vv
Superior:
Cazenove Concentrated 0.4917 0.9139 0.8878 0.7796
(0.5041) (1.7757) (9.0091) (6.1624)
(Bottom quartile)
Friends Ivory & Sime 0.3459 0.6460 1.1249 0.9015
(0.5894) (2.0859) (20.2248) (12.6263)
(Upper quartile)
Gartmore 0.6181 0.8357 1.0210 0.7897
(0.7489) (1.9187) (12.3988) (7.4703)
(Bottom quartile)
Hill Samuel 0.0883 0.3483 1.0107 0.8328
(0.2463) (1.8400) (28.6533) (18.3905)
(Bottom quartile)
KQEP Enhanced 0.2124 0.3789 1.0113 0.9901
(0.66667) (2.2533) (40.0215) (31.5213)
(3rd quartile)
London Life -1.1817 0.2203 1.0659 0.8383
(-2.3113) (0.8171) (24.4517) (14.9802)
(Upper quartile) (Bottom quartile)
                                                
16
 Refer to table 5 in section 4.3.
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Morley (was GA) -0.4979 0.2239 0.9593 0.8458
(-1.2463) (1.0622) (26.2824) (18.0506)
(2nd quartile) (Bottom quartile)
Swiss Life 0.8298 1.0516 1.1365 0.9412
(0.6159) (1.4790) (8.6626) (5.5880)
(Upper quartile)
Inferior:
Britannic Inv. Managers 1.4776 0.0325 0.9688 1.1504
(2.8878) (0.1205) (19.2115) (17.7701)
(2nd quartile) (Top quartile)
Colonial -0.4032 -0.6960 0.8969 1.1320
(-0.6880) (-2.2502) (16.5935) (16.3131)
(Bottom quartile) (Top quartile)
Equitable High Income 0.3878 -0.8802 0.8999 1.0409
(0.3601) (-1.5490) (8.7653) (7.8972)
(Bottom quartile) (Top quartile)
Friendsivory&Sime (FP) 1.1211 0.1709 0.9484 1.0126
(1.3088) (0.3781) (11.1464) (9.2700)
(2nd quartile) (3rd quartile)
Guardian 0.0028 -1.4380 1.1087 1.3953
(0.0031) (-2.9743) (13.1117) (12.8526)
(Top quartile) (Top quartile)
Martin Currie UK Growth 1.9332 -0.6119 0.8294 1.2165
(1.6777) (-1.0062) (7.3153) (8.3581)
(Bottom quartile) (Top quartile)
Morley (was CU) 0.0118 -0.4817 0.8684 1.1088
(0.0256) (-1.9867) (22.4610) (22.3403)
(Bottom quartile) (Top quartile)
National Mutual Life 0.9270 -0.2874 0.9730 1.0469
(1.4997) (-0.8810) (17.1871) (14.4041)
(2nd quartile) (Top quartile)
    For the first set of funds in the latter table, the LPW measure for 11 >v and
12 >v  attribute a better and, most of the times statistically significant,
abnormal performance compared with the one reported by the LPW measure
with 10 1 << v  and 10 2 << v , indicating the presence of skills that lead to the
funds outperforming the benchmark. This is confirmed when examining the
results of the two-beta model discussed in section 4.3, since each of the
funds presented in the table above does exhibit, during the time period under
study, signs of timing abilities relative to the rest of the sample of funds, for
one of the two market states. Indeed, the funds either possess a relatively
high uβ  (low dβ ) which for most of the funds in the first set of table 15 lies
in the top (bottom) 25% of the entire sample. Moreover, all the funds exhibit
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a dβ <1, with Cazanove Concentrated possessing the lowest dβ  of all our
sample of funds, and 6 out of the 8 funds possess a uβ  >1. Hence, the LPW
measure for 11 >v and 12 >v , in contrast to the LPW measure with 10 1 << v
and 10 2 << v , does seem to have picked up some extra information about the
timing skills exhibited by some of the funds in the sample and have
associated with these funds a positive and significant abnormal performance
over the benchmark.
    A similar analysis, but with stronger results, can be applied to the funds to
which the LPW measures for 11 >v and 12 >v  attribute, in table 15, a worse
performance than the LPW with 10 1 << v  and 10 2 << v ; the results show that
they exhibit signs of bad timing behaviour in both states of the market,
which could explain the low performance results associated with them. We
note that the four funds for which the LPW performance measure with
10 1 << v  and 10 2 << v  had attributed controversial results17 are among the
funds reported in table 15, with the LPW measure with 11 >v and 12 >v
attributing to them, as expected, a low or negligible performance.
    It is evident from the results presented in the second set of funds in table
15 that all these funds show very strong evidence of weak timing skills: they
all possess the wrong combination of a low uβ  (3 in the bottom quartile, 3 in
the second quartile) and a high dβ  (6 in the top quartile and 1 in the third
quartile)18. Indeed, a low uβ  (a high dβ ) indicates that the fund manager did
not possess any prior information that allowed him to forecast the direction
of the market and then increase (decrease) his portfolio’s beta accordingly to
                                                
17
 Refer to the discussion in section 5.1.
18
 The only exception is Guardian who possesses a high uβ  that lies in the top quartile.
However, this is accompanied by the highest dβ  in the entire sample.
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capitalise on such information and gain abnormal performance. Hence, for
these particular funds, it seems that the fund managers did not have any
special skills and were not able to change their portfolio’s beta in a way to
take advantage of the market.
    Consequently, the LPW measure for 11 >v and 12 >v  was successful at
detecting this bad or lack of timing skills and associating significant negative
performance evaluation with such a behaviour, a result that contrasted with
the LPW measure for 10 1 << v  and 10 2 << v  ’s assessment. For instance,
Morley (was CU), as shown in table 15, possess a low uβ  that lie in the top
quartile and a high dβ  that lie in the bottom quartile, proving that the fund
manager was not able to use any prior information or any other special skill
to predict the movement of the market and capitalise on his expectations.
The LPW measures with 11 >v  and 12 >v  was able to pick up on this
behaviour and as a result associated with this fund a very significant
negative abnormal performance; the LPW measure with 10 1 << v  and
10 2 << v , on the other hand, reported a negligible performance that ranked
the fund’s performance as very close to the benchmark’s.
    At the end of this section, we can conclude that the LPW measures for
11 >v and 12 >v  do seem to be able to detect timing skills and reward them
accordingly far better than the LPW measure with 10 1 << v  and 10 2 << v .
Hence, it does seem that the former measure has overcome the shortcoming
that the LPW measure with 10 1 << v  and 10 2 << v  has been shown to face in
section 5.1. To analyse this more carefully, we compare next, in table 16, the
set of weights used in the calculations of the performance scores in the two
cases, in the attempt to show how the second case does possess a bias-free
vector of weights.
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TABLE 16
Comparison of the two weight vectors used in the calculation of the LPW performance scores
in the two different cases considered
    Quarter                      
t
w               
t
w           Quarter                   
t
w                
t
w
                           ( 120,110 <<<< vv )       ( 12,11 >> vv )                  ( 120,110 <<<< vv )     ( 12,11 >> vv )
Mar-1990 0.0172 0.0495 Mar-1995 0.0210 0.0086
Jun-1990 0.0095 0.0153 Jun-1995 0.0081 0.0171
Sep-1990 0.0079 0.0995 Sep-1995 0.0065 0.0203
Dec-1990 0.0068 0.0194 Dec-1995 0.0099 0.0149
Mar-1991 0.0033 0.0335 Mar-1996 0.0132 0.0120
Jun-1991 0.0369 0.0249 Jun-1996 0.0225 0.0081
Sep-1991 0.0053 0.0235 Sep-1996 0.0088 0.0162
Dec-1991 0.0176 0.0486 Dec-1996 0.0117 0.0131
Mar-1992 0.3529 0.0033 Mar-1997 0.0099 0.0149
Jun-1992 0.0091 0.0158 Jun-1997 0.0115 0.0133
Sep-1992 0.0687 0.0142 Sep-1997 0.0041 0.0283
Dec-1992 0.0037 0.0306 Dec-1997 0.0568 0.0169
Mar-1993 0.0116 0.0132 Mar-1998 0.0035 0.0319
Jun-1993 0.0187 0.0093 Jun-1998 0.0673 0.0145
Sep-1993 0.0079 0.0175 Sep-1998 0.0092 0.0875
Dec-1993 0.0044 0.0269 Dec-1998 0.0036 0.0311
Mar-1994 0.0188 0.0457 Mar-1999 0.0059 0.0218
Jun-1994 0.0191 0.0451 Jun-1999 0.0270 0.0071
Sep-1994 0.0139 0.0116 Sep-1999 0.0236 0.0372
Dec-1994 0.0394 0.0054 Dec-1999 0.0034 0.0326
    As one can obviously deduce from the results presented in table 16, the
LPW measure’s vector of weights in the case where 11 >v and 12 >v  is not
subject to the same problem that faced the LPW measure when both 1v and
2v  were required to be less than one. Indeed, the weight in quarter March
1992, for the LPW measure with 11 >v and 12 >v , is not high enough to
influence the overall performance score and hence this measure has
overcome the shortcoming that might face the LPW measure if 1v and 2v  are
required to be less than one. Consequently, the LPW measure with 11 >v and
12 >v  does possess an edge, which enables it to report more accurate results.
    Finally, at the end of this section, we propose an alternative way to
overcome the problem faced by the LPW with 10 1 << v  and 10 2 << v , which
allows us to still consider an investor who is risk-loving for losses and risk-
averse for gains. Indeed, in risk terms, the problem amounts to huge
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rewards/losses for over/under-performing the benchmark when the latter’s
return is close to that of cash and hence it is hard to attach a great deal of
meaning to this and to what it could possibly reflect on individual concerns.
To illustrate this in a simpler setting, let’s consider a world of Two Fund
Money Separation, involving a benchmark and cash. In such a world,
different managers will hold different proportions of these two assets.
However, when the benchmark and cash possess the same return, all 2-funds
managers will have the same return and hence, cross-sectional volatility will
be very low. It follows that, at that point in time, a small amount of
over/under-performance will be identified with a high/low ranking across
managers.
    Another way to overcome this possible shortcoming while keeping the
same risk preferences is to drop the offending points, the quarter in which
the benchmark performs to closely to cash. Applying this to our sample, we
re-evaluate the performance of the fund managers using only 39 quarters,
omitting to use the quarter in which the above problem occurs: March 1992.
To achieve that, we solve the minimisation problem for this new data and
obtain the following values for the necessary parameters: 1v =0.15, 2v =0.25
and 3262.2=λ , with the weighted sum of the benchmark’s excess returns
∑
=
T
t
tBt rw
1
~~ being equal to the negligible figure of 4101867.3 −×− . The
descriptive statistics of the performance evaluation results obtained in such a
setting are presented next:
TABLE 17
The descriptive statistics of the LPW performance results for 110 << v and 120 << v ,
calculated over 39 quarters
Mean -0.0331 Minimum value -2.9413
Standard Error 0.1085 1st quartile (25th percentile) -0.1439
Standard deviation 0.7196 Median (50th percentile) 0.1227
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Sample variance 0.5178 3rd quartile (75th percentile) 0.2216
Excess kurtosis 5.8857 Maximum value 2.1216
Skewness -1.1860
Range 5.0629 Jarque-Bera Statistic 73.8252
Count 44 Probability 0.0047
    Examining the results presented in the above table show that they are
distinct form the results reported by the LPW for 10 1 << v  and 10 2 << v  that
was calculated over the 40 quarters and more in accordance with the
evaluation reported by the conventional measures as well as with the LPW
for 11 >v and 12 >v . Indeed, the average abnormal performance is at the very
low level of  –0.0331%, and lies in the second quartile, indicating that on
average our sample of fund does not seem to exhibit significant abnormal
performance. Moreover, the results are clearly negatively skewed; the
bottom quartile range is equal to 2.7974% while the interquartile range is
only equal to 0.3665%. Indeed, the results seem to indicate in this setting
more negative than positive abnormal behaviour. Indeed, of the 13
significant performance scores, 8 lie in the bottom quartile and 5 in the top
quartile. In addition, the top quartile’s range is much smaller than the bottom
quartile, being equal to 1.8999%.
    Hence, dropping the controversial points in the sample seem to provide a
solution to the shortcoming that the LPW for 10 1 << v  and 10 2 << v  might
encounter. To see this more clearly, table 18 compares next this new
measure with all the other measures that were considered in this study.
    The low correlation between the LPW with 10 1 << v  and 10 2 << v
calculated over 39 quarters and the LPW with 10 1 << v  and 10 2 << v
calculated over 40 quarters (0.7347) indicate that the former measure seem
to have overcome the problem discussed earlier. Indeed, the performance
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results reported by the LPW with 10 1 << v  and 10 2 << v  that was calculated
by dropping the controversial quarter is more correlated with the results of
LPW with 11 >v and 12 >v , and very highly correlated with the evaluation of
the conventional methods.
    Indeed, the performance results reported by the LPW with 10 1 << v  and
10 2 << v  that was calculated by dropping the controversial quarter is more
correlated with the results of LPW with 11 >v and 12 >v , and very highly
correlated with the evaluation of the conventional methods. Moreover, if one
examines in table 18 the performance scores of the four controversial funds
discussed in section 5.1 table 10, one can clearly see that by dropping the
controversial quarter lead to the LPW with 10 1 << v  and 10 2 << v  attributing
to them a performance that is closer to their true performance.
TABLE 18
Comparison of the LPW’s performance results for three different schemes,
followed by the correlation matrix of the new measure with the rest of the measures considered in this study
                                 
120
110
<<
<<
v
v
  
12
11
>
>
v
v
                                 
120
110
<<
<<
v
v
 
12
11
>
>
v
v
                                 
120
110
<<
<<
v
v
  
12
11
>
>
v
v
                              LPW         LPW
                               (40)          (39)
LPW
(40)
                              LPW         LPW
                               (40)          (39)
LPW
(40)
                              LPW         LPW
                               (40)          (39)
LPW
(40)
Abn Amro Friendsivory&Sime (I&S) Morley (was CU)
Perf. score 4.1086 2.1216 2.0320 Perf. score -0.2753 0.2109 -0.0980 Perf. score 0.0118 0.1171 -0.4817
t-value (1.6098) (1.4129) (1.5086) t-value (-0.3424) (0.4459) (-0.2310) t-value (0.0256) (0.4333) (-1.9867)
Aegon Gartmore Morley (was GA)
Perf. score 0.1244 0.2106 0.1596 Perf. score 0.6181 0.2006 0.8357 Perf. score -0.4979 -0.0973 0.2240
t-value (0.2323) (0.6686) (0.5649) t-value (0.7489) (0.4131) (1.9187) t-value (-1.2463) (-0.4139) (1.0622)
AXA Sun Life Gartmore/Natwest Index Morley PP (Was NU)
Perf. score -0.3995 -0.5463 0.0491 Perf. score -0.1555 0.1246 0.1146 Perf. score 0.2347 -0.1655 0.3164
t-value (-0.9332) (-2.1688) (0.2173) t-value (-0.8036) (1.0950) (1.1227) t-value (0.4540) (-0.5440) (1.1596)
Britannic Govett National Mutual Life
Perf. score 1.4776 0.4621 0.0325 Perf. score 0.5583 0.4570 0.0161 Perf. score 0.9270 -0.6355 -0.2874
t-value (2.8878) (1.5349) (0.1205) t-value (0.5928) (0.8248) (0.0324) t-value (1.4997) (-1.7473) (-0.8810)
Cazenove Con. Guardian Norhtern Trust
Perf. score 0.4917 0.3587 0.9140 Perf. score 0.0028 -1.1371 -1.4380 Perf. score 0.1860 -0.3883 -0.1981
t-value (0.5041) (0.6251) (1.7757) t-value (0.0031) (-2.1096) (-2.9743) t-value (0.2060) (-0.7311) (-0.4158)
Clerical Medical Henderson Prudential M&G
Perf. score 0.6334 -0.0533 0.3533 Perf. score 0.1108 0.4691 0.0806 Perf. score -0.2625 0.1664 -0.0794
t-value (1.4164) (-0.2025) (1.4969) t-value (0.2425) (1.7457) (0.3343) t-value (-0.6838) (0.7370) (-0.3918)
Colonial Hill Samuel Royal Sunalliance
Perf. score -0.4032 -0.0554 -0.6960 Perf. score 0.0884 -0.0058 0.3483 Perf. score -0.1006 0.3861 0.1791
t-value (-0.6880) (-0.1608) (-2.2502) t-value (0.2463) (-0.0273) (1.8400) t-value (-0.1703) (1.1110) (0.5747)
Deutsche INVESCO I Scottish Life
Perf. score 0.8105 0.3717 0.8669 Perf. score -0.1449 0.0960 0.1084 Perf. score -0.2429 -0.1367 -0.0628
t-value (1.2414) (0.9677) (2.5161) t-value (-0.7138) (0.8036) (1.0121) t-value (-0.8129) (-0.7778) (-0.3982)
Dresdner RCM Invesco UK Core SLC Asset Management
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Perf. score -0.6978 0.1968 0.2171 Perf. score -0.4181 -0.7198 -0.5027 Perf. score 0.0144 -0.3986 -0.0010
t-value (-0.7097) (0.3401) (0.4184) t-value (-0.3758) (-1.0996) (-0.8561) t-value (0.0336) (-1.5880) (-0.0046)
Equitable High Income KQEP Enhanced Standard Life
Perf. score 0.3878 -0.8471 -0.8802 Perf. score 0.2124 0.2538 0.3789 Perf. score 0.0105 0.3660 0.1872
t-value (0.3601) (-1.3371) (-1.5490) t-value (0.6667) (1.3539) (2.2533) t-value (0.0313) (1.8590) (1.0600)
Equitable Pelican Legal & Generali Swiss Life
Perf. score -0.9095 -1.2453 -0.5261 Perf. score -0.1223 0.1165 0.0977 Perf. score 0.8298 0.7782 1.0516
t-value (-1.4796) (-3.4432) (-1.6219) t-value (-0.6446) (1.0441) (0.9764) t-value (0.6159) (0.9818) (1.4790)
Equitable Spec. Sits. Legal & Generalp Swiss Life Index
Perf. score -2.8031 -2.9413 -1.8861 Perf. score -0.0054 0.1209 0.0674 Perf. score -0.1039 0.2092 0.2403
t-value (-1.3948) (-2.4876) (-1.7783) t-value (-0.0220) (0.8412) (0.5228) t-value (-0.2814) (0.9627) (1.2329)
Friends I&S Stewardship London Life Winterthur Life
Perf. score 0.4854 0.2098 0.4071 Perf. score -1.1817 -0.0438 0.2203 Perf. score -1.1545 -1.1447 -0.8910
t-value (0.3548) (0.2606) (0.5638) t-value (-2.3129) (-0.1456) (0.8171) t-value (-1.5445) (-2.6029) (-2.2587)
Friends Ivory & Sime Martin Currie UK Growth Zurich Scudder
Perf. score 0.3459 0.1354 0.6460 Perf. score 1.9332 -0.0053 -0.6119 Perf. score 0.2800 0.1899 0.2310
t-value (0.5894) (0.3922) (2.0859) t-value (1.6777) (-0.0078) (-1.0062) t-value (0.6204) (0.7152) (0.9699)
Friendsivory&Sime (FP) Merrill Lynch Balanced
Perf. score 1.1211 0.6406 0.1709 Perf. score -0.2035 0.1396 0.2199
t-value (1.3088) (1.2711) (0.3781) t-value (-0.3790) (0.4418) (0.7762)
Correlation matrix:
LPW
Measure
39 quarters
LPW
Measure
40 quarters
LPW
Measure
40 quarters
PW
Measure
Jensen
Measure
T-M
measure
Sharpe
ratio
Sortino
ratio
Inform.
ratio
120
110
<<
<<
v
v
120
110
<<
<<
v
v
12
11
>
>
v
v
LPW (over 39 quarters) 1 0.7347 0.8457 0.9248 0.9367 0.9377 0.8952 0.5619 0.6779
120,110 <<<< vv
Hence, following this alternative method could lead to obtaining less
controversial and more sensible results and hence to solving the problem
faced in section 5.1.
6. Conclusion
    This study has proposed a new measure of performance measurement
(LPW) that introduces the loss aversion theory to the field of performance
evaluation. To achieve that, we combine the already established positive
period weighting measure (PW) developed by Grinblatt and Titman (1989)
with the loss aversion utility function for two different types of investors, the
first being risk-averse for gains and risk-loving for losses while the second
being risk-loving for gains and risk-averse for losses.
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    Although the empirical evidence in the literature points out to an
individual investor who is risk-averse for gains and risk-loving for losses,
the results in this study shows that in this particular case, the LPW
performance measure faces a possible shortcoming that is due to the
structure of the marginal utility of the loss aversion function and the
dynamics behind the construction of the PW performance measure’s vector
of weights. Hence, when it comes to the evaluation of the utility of an
institution, it seems that new sets of rules hold than when considering an
individual; to look at what constitutes representative behvaviour in a
universe of institutional investors may exhibit different risk characteristics
from private investors. An alternative pragmatic approach was to delete
those contributions to performance where the excess returns of the
benchmark are zero.
    The results reported by the LPW performance measure for the case of an
investor who is risk-averse for losses and risk-loving for gains are more
compatible with the traditional measures’ evaluation and do seem to pick up
on the timing skills exhibited by the active fund managers and then reward
them accordingly.
    In conclusion, using parameter-dependent evaluation methods will always
lead to the adoption of results that are controversial and that would differ
drastically depending on which values of the parameters are adopted.
Adopting a non-parametric approach might be able to go pass this problem
and hence present the researcher with better and more reliable results.
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